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Network Neutrality and the Economics of
Congestion
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s Brand X decision has reignited the debate over “network
neutrality,” which would limit broadband networks’ authority to impose restrictions
on end users’ ability to access content, run applications, and attach devices and to
charge content and application providers higher prices for higher levels of quality of
service. In this Article, Professor Christopher Yoo draws on the economics of
congestion to propose a new analytical framework for assessing such restrictions.
He concludes that when transaction costs render metering network-usage uneconomi-
cal, imposing restrictions on bandwidth-intensive activities may well enhance eco-
nomic welfare by preventing high-volume users from imposing uncompensated costs
on low-volume users. Usage of bandwidth-intensive services can thus serve as a
useful proxy for congestion externalities just as port usage served as a proxy for
consumption of lighthouse services in Coase’s classic critique of the economic
parable of the lighthouse. In addition, content delivery networks and other commer-
cial caching systems represent still another innovative way to manage the problems
associated with congestion and latency that would be foreclosed by network neutral-
ity. Furthermore, allowing network owners to differentiate their services can serve
as a form of price discrimination that can mitigate the sources of market failure that
require regulatory intervention in the first place. This framework suggests that
broadband policy would be better served by embracing a network diversity principle
that would eschew a one-size-fits-all approach and would allow network providers
to experiment with different institutional forms until it can be shown that a particu-
lar practice is harming competition. At most, concerns that telephone companies
may prevent end users from using their digital subscriber line (DSL) connections to
access Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) provide support for targeted regulatory
intervention. They do not justify a blanket prohibition of end user restrictions that
network neutrality proponents envision.
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INTRODUCTION
During the Internet’s initial, narrowband phase of development, Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) pursued a variety of architectural approaches. Some
ISPs, such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online, initially adopted
relatively restrictive policies, which only provided end users with access to
proprietary applications and content and charged them for network usage on a
per-minute basis.1 Others followed a more permissive approach, opening up
their networks to all content and applications providers on a nondiscriminatory
basis and allowing end users to download any content, run any application, and
attach any device for a flat monthly fee. The latter approach ultimately proved
more attractive to consumers, and end users became accustomed to a world in
which they faced few restrictions either on the ways they could use their
network connections or on the amount of bandwidth they consumed.
This same debate has resurfaced as the Internet has begun to migrate from a
narrowband to a broadband architecture, which in the residential and small-
business markets is provided primarily by cable modem systems and a telephone-
based technology known as digital subscriber lines (DSL).2 Once again, network
owners have begun to experiment with more restrictive approaches. With
respect to end users, some network owners have begun to offer bandwidth tiers
to end users, in which the amount that customers pay varies with the amount of
bandwidth with which they are provided.3 Others have placed restrictions on
end users’ latitude to run certain applications or attach certain devices.4 Still
others have considered alternative pricing relationships with respect to content
1. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public
Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007, 2087 (2003); James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last
Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 86 (2000).
2. See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R.
16978, 17015–17 ¶¶ 51–52 (2003). In contrast, large business customers tend to obtain broadband
services through high-volume technologies that are quite distinct from those used by residential and
small customers. See id. at 17013–15 ¶¶ 46–49, 17061–63 ¶¶ 123–129.
3. See, e.g., AT&T Yahoo! High Speed Internet, https://swot.sbc.com/swot/dslMassMarketCatalog.do?
doview&serviceTypeDYNAMICIP (offering DSL at various speeds at six different price points
ranging from $12.99 per month to $69.99 per month).
4. The most systematic review of these types of restrictions is Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 158–62, 173–74 (2003). For less
comprehensive surveys, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 156–58 (2002); François Bar et al.,
Access and Innovation Policy for the Third-Generation Internet, 24 TELECOMM. POL’Y 489, 509–14
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and applications providers, under which transmission speed would depend on
the tier of service purchased.5
These developments touched off a paroxysm of criticism from content provid-
ers and device manufacturers,6 academics,7 and public interest groups.8 Al-
though the details of the various proposals vary, they all fit comfortably under
the rubric of “network neutrality,” in that they all call for regulatory limitations
on network owners’ ability to discriminate against particular content, applica-
tions, and devices.
This debate has begun to influence policymaking. A recent policy statement
issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) endorsed a version
of network neutrality,9 albeit subject to some caveats.10 Network neutrality has
also influenced the recent Verizon-MCI and SBC-AT&T mergers11 and has
played a key role in shaping congressional debates about telecommunications
(2000); Jerome H. Saltzer, “Open Access” is Just the Tip of the Iceberg (Oct. 22, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/openaccess.html).
5. See, e.g., David Ho, Varying Fees for Access to the Net a Possibility: Issue May Be Forced as
Traffic Jumps, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 18, 2006, at F3.
6. See Ex parte Communication from the Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators at 3–4 (Jan.
8, 2003), Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) (CS Dkt. No. 02-52),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdfpdf&id_document
6513401671 [hereinafter CBUI Ex parte]; Comments of the High Tech Broadband Coalition at 6–13
(June 17, 2002), Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) (CS Dkt.
No. 02-52), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdfpdf&id_
document6513198026 [hereinafter HTBC Comments].
7. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 26–48, 147–76, 246–49; Bar et al., supra note 4, at 510; Wu, supra
note 4, at 165; Ex parte Letter of Timothy Wu and Lawrence Lessig at 12–15 (filed Aug. 22, 2003),
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) (CS Dkt. No. 02–52), available
at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdfpdf&id_document6514683884 [here-
inafter Wu & Lessig, Ex parte].
8. See, e.g., John Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband: Preserving an Open Internet
Through Net Neutrality: A Public Knowledge White Paper (Feb. 6, 2006), available at http://
static.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf; Letter from Jeannine Kenney
(Consumers Union), Mark Cooper (Consumer Federation of America), Ben Scott (Free Press) & Harold
Feld (Media Access Project) to Sen. Ron Wyden (Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://www.hearusnow.org/
internet/24/; Center for Digital Democracy, Internet Under Attack: Act Now to Preserve the Public
Internet, available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/getinvolved/NetNeutralityAction.html; Common
Cause, Keep the Internet Free and Open: Take Action Now to Protect Network Neutrality, available at
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?cdkLNK1MQIwG&b1234951.
9. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy
Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Policy Statement].
10. See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
11. See Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of
Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 18437 ¶ 3, 18492 ¶ 109, 18509 ¶ 143,
18537 ¶ 221 (2005) [hereinafter Verizon-MCI Order]; SBC Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corp.
Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R.
18290, 18293 ¶ 3, 18350–51 ¶ 108, 18368 ¶ 144, 18392 ¶ 211, app.F (2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T
Order].
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reform.12 In the process, network neutrality has emerged as one of the hottest
issues in communications policy. To date, the policy decision has been framed
as a choice between universal interoperability, in which end users remain free to
access content, run applications, and attach devices as they see fit, and a world
of “walled gardens,” in which the subscribers to any particular network will
only be able to enjoy the benefits of a limited number of Internet-based services.
Policymakers are urged to choose between these two options based on their
prediction of which architectural approach would better promote social wel-
fare.13
I believe that the current debate has framed the issues in too narrow a manner.
The problem is that—as even network neutrality proponents concede—
deviations from network neutrality may well be motivated by legitimate con-
cerns about network management and that it can be difficult, if not impossible,
for experts to predict which architectural approach will eventually prevail.14 For
example, as Lessig himself notes, the vast potential of the Internet was lost not
only on incumbent network owners like AT&T, but also on almost every
computer science expert presented with the concept of the World Wide Web.15
The difficulty of predicting the future is demonstrated even more eloquently by
the furor surrounding America Online’s acquisition of Time Warner. Many
experts warned that the merger would create an Internet juggernaut, in which
the combination of America Online’s Internet content with the transmission
capabilities of Warner Cable would chill innovation and with which other
providers would struggle to compete. Needless to say, these dire predictions
failed to materialize, as the vertically integrated business model that America
Online pursued with such confidence ultimately proved to be a colossal fail-
ure.16 In the absence of some reason to believe that policymakers will be able to
anticipate which architecture will ultimately emerge as optimal, mandating one
architecture over another has the unfortunate effect of foreclosing exploration of
the potential benefits of alternative approaches.
Fortunately, competition policy offers a middle ground that obviates the need
for policymakers to make such judgments. If the choice between two architec-
tural approaches is ambiguous, policymakers have the option of permitting both
alternatives to go forward until a concrete harm to competition can be demon-
strated. In other words, rather than mandating any particular architecture,
policymakers can instead embrace a regime of network diversity that allows
12. See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
13. Since network neutrality proponents defend their proposals almost exclusively in terms of the
economic benefits of innovation, this Article discusses the issues solely in economic terms. I therefore
set aside for another day any discussion of noneconomic issues, such as network neutrality’s implica-
tions for democratic deliberation or the First Amendment.
14. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 46; Wu, supra note 4, at 143, 153–54; cf. Saltzer, supra note 4
(conceding that all such restrictions can be justified by a “technical excuse”).
15. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 31–33, 42–44.
16. See Susan P. Crawford, Someone to Watch Over Me: Social Policies for the Internet 15–18
(Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 129 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract796825.
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network owners to pursue different strategies. Unless such experimentation
poses potential harms that are catastrophic or irreversible, the emerging consen-
sus argues against imposing proactive regulation on the basis of speculation
about the likely impact on competition.17
This approach places regulators in a more restrained and humble position that
is better suited to their institutional capabilities. Rather than asking them to
determine which architectural design is likely to prove more socially beneficial,
it asks them only to determine whether a plausible case can be made to justify
each possible approach and whether allowing experimentation with each ap-
proach would pose potentially catastrophic or irreversible harms. This approach
is more than just a question of which side bears the burden of proof.18 Instead, it
represents a true middle course that allows policymakers to avoid having to
foreclose any particular alternative when confronted with a policy choice that is
ambiguous.
Recast in this manner, the key regulatory question is whether the restrictions
criticized by network neutrality proponents are so pernicious and unjustifiable
that experimentation should not be permitted. An analysis of the economics of
the Internet reveals the existence of a number of plausible arguments demonstrat-
ing that deviations from network neutrality might well enhance economic
welfare.
The key to understanding why this might be the case is recognizing the fact
that the Internet is subject to congestion. When networks are subject to conges-
tion, one customer’s usage of the network can degrade the quality of service
that other customers receive. The primary finding of the literature on the
economics of congestion is that competitive markets will reach an efficient
equilibrium if each user is charged a usage-sensitive price set equal to their
marginal contribution to congestion.19 As a result, some commentators have
argued in favor of shifting all Internet services to usage-sensitive pricing.20 At
the same time, flat-fee pricing has persisted for a wide range of other congest-
ible resources, such as ski lifts and local telephone service. The persistence of
these practices has led to the creation of a literature exploring the circumstances
under which usage-sensitive pricing might prove uneconomic. The general
thrust of this literature is that transaction costs associated with a usage-sensitive
17. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 58–61, 109–17
(2005); see also Benjamin, supra note 1.
18. Cf. Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 91
(2004).
19. See, e.g., Eitan Berglas, On the Theory of Clubs, 66 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 116, 119
(1976).
20. See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Pricing Congestible Network Resources, 13
IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS COMM. 1141 (1995), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/jmm/papers/
Pricing_Congestible_Resources.pdf; Wu, supra note 4, at 154; cf. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327 (1998) (arguing that the economics of congestion justified requiring
Internet service providers to pay interstate access charges).
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pricing system can consume all of the economic benefits associated with a shift
to usage-based pricing. When that is the case, economic welfare would be better
served if end users were charged flat rates instead of usage-sensitive prices.21
While the debate between flat-rate and usage-sensitive pricing is an important
one, it is incomplete in that it frames the range of available pricing options too
narrowly. Specifically, it overlooks the insight, derived from Ronald Coase’s
classic critique of the economic parable of the lighthouse,22 that the high
transaction costs associated with metered pricing can also be avoided by finding
an alternative activity that can serve as a proxy for usage. If that alternative
activity is easier to meter, it can provide a useful approximation of actual usage
of the primary services.
Consideration of a broader range of institutional solutions to the pricing
problem expands the policy space in important ways. It suggests that allowing
broadband providers to impose restrictions on bandwidth-intensive end user
activities could well represent a more cost-effective way to address the prob-
lems of congestion. In fact, the types of restrictions that cause network neutral-
ity proponents the greatest concern are precisely the type of activities that tend
to impose congestion costs on other users. Viewed from this perspective,
bandwidth management and end user restrictions are just two points in a
spectrum of alternative institutional approaches to solving the problems of
network management.23 I need not determine which of the many possible ways
to manage congestion on the Internet will ultimately prove most economical.
For our purposes, it suffices to acknowledge that the optimal solution might take
on one of a range of institutional forms. The indeterminacy of the problem
justifies adopting policies that do not foreclose network owners from experiment-
ing with any particular institutional solution absent the demonstration of con-
crete competitive harm. Indeed, there is no reason to presume that the eventual
solution will be uniform, and it is quite conceivable that different portions of the
network might pursue different institutional solutions.
This analysis also suggests that prohibiting last-mile providers from deviating
from network neutrality may actually harm consumers. Simply put, the current
regime of flat-rate pricing and unrestricted access discourages innovation in
21. See Robert J. Barro & Paul M. Romer, Ski-Lift Pricing, with Applications to Labor and Other
Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 875, 876–79 (1987); Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Exclusion
and the Theory of Clubs, 24 CANADIAN J. ECON. 888, 889, 895–96 (1991); Kangoh Lee, Transaction
Costs and Equilibrium Pricing of Congested Public Goods with Imperfect Information, 45 J. PUB. ECON.
337, 340–43 (1991); cf. MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra note 20, at 1145 (exploring Internet pricing
when transaction costs render usage-based pricing uneconomical). Barro and Romer did not initially
frame their analysis in terms of congestion economics but later acknowledged the connection. See
Robert J. Barro & Paul M. Romer, Ski-Lift Pricing, with Applications to Labor and Other Markets:
Reply, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 378 (1991) (discussing congestion costs).
22. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974), reprinted in FAMOUS
FABLES IN ECONOMICS 32–48 (Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002).
23. As a result, network neutrality does not represent a middle ground between structural regulation
and deregulation, as some have suggested. See Wu, supra note 18, at 88–90. Instead, end user
restrictions and network management are more properly regarded as two sides of the same coin.
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network management. In the process, it allows high-volume users to impose
costs on low-volume users, in effect requiring the latter to subsidize the former.
Taking a broader vision of consumer welfare reveals that allowing network
owners to place restrictions on high-bandwidth uses can benefit consumers by
making possible new ways to manage network traffic and to force those who
create the most congestion on the Internet to bear the costs they impose on
others. Conversely, low-volume users may well benefit from such restrictions
through increases in the quality of the service they receive and decreases in the
prices they pay.24 Indeed, the emergence of potentially beneficial practices, such
as backbone peering, content delivery networks like Akamai, network-based
spam filtering, and blocking websites known to be the source of viruses, attests
to the extent to which the Internet is already far from “neutral.”
On a more fundamental level, adoption of a more permissive approach to end
user restrictions would parallel the shift in the vision of the ideal form of
competition that has taken place under the antitrust laws. Prior to the mid-
1970s, the Supreme Court took an extremely hostile view towards vertical
integration that combined manufacturing and retail delivery under the same
corporate umbrella, as well as vertical contractual arrangements (such as exclu-
sive dealing contracts, long-term contracts, territorial exclusivity, and require-
ments contracts) that were tantamount to the same thing. Over time, the Court
has become considerably more hospitable towards vertical integration, recogniz-
ing that vertical integration can represent an important means through which
firms can minimize transaction costs. In the process, the Court rejected categori-
cal prohibitions in favor of a more nuanced approach that evaluates the competi-
tive impact of vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints on a
case-by-case basis.25
The case for permitting last-mile networks to experiment with end user
restrictions also draws on economic considerations separate from congestion.
For example, by allowing network owners to differentiate the services they
offer, exclusivity can play a key role in mitigating the sources of market failure
that require regulatory intervention in the first place. Indeed, some degree of
discrimination and differentiation is inevitable in any industry characterized by
large fixed costs. Furthermore, close analysis reveals that access requirements
like network neutrality are less justifiable and less likely to succeed in a world
in which competition among last-mile providers is growing ever more robust,
natural interfaces between companies are complex and constantly changing, and
the avalanche of content available on the Internet has heightened end users’
reliance on media filters exercising editorial discretion.
I do not claim that every deviation from network neutrality will necessarily
enhance economic welfare. My point is a more limited one. For my purposes, it
24. See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Some FAQs About Usage-Based Pricing, 28
COMPUTER NETWORKS & ISDN SYS. 257, 258 (1995).
25. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52–59 & n.21 (1977).
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is sufficient if some deviations from network neutrality may plausibly be
motivated by legitimate concerns, and it is hard to distinguish procompetitive
and anticompetitive uses of such restrictions, as network neutrality proponents
have conceded is often the case.26 When it is possible that intervention may do
more harm than good, and particularly when consumers do not face any
immediate harm, the more prudent course would be to forego locking the
network into any particular architecture. Since the threatened harms are neither
catastrophic nor irreversible, competition policy supports forbearing from forbid-
ding particular practices until a specific harm to competition can be demon-
strated. Any competitive problems that do emerge can be addressed through the
type of targeted intervention imposed by the FCC in Madison River, limited to
prohibiting the broadband provider from blocking access to those applications
that compete directly with the broadband provider’s core business.27 They
would not justify the broad prohibition of end user restrictions envisioned under
network neutrality.
The balance of the Article is organized as follows: Part I provides a brief
overview of the debate over network neutrality. Part II identifies the sources of
congestion on the Internet. Part III lays out the basic economics of congestion,
paying particular attention to the impact of transaction costs. Part IV applies the
insights provided by the foregoing analysis to the broadband industry, conclud-
ing that the types of restrictions that have drawn criticism from network
neutrality proponents may be economically justified. Indeed, if one adopts a
broader notion of consumer welfare, such restrictions may well be a benefit to
consumers by forcing heavy bandwidth users to bear the congestion costs they
impose on other users and by effectively lowering the prices paid by light
bandwidth users who previously were forced to cross-subsidize heavier users. It
also engages the broader arguments about the economics of innovation and the
dangers of imposing regulation in the face of prospective harms. Part V bolsters
the basic congestion-based argument by examining the ways that exclusivity
can mitigate the sources of market failure that justify regulation in the first
place.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE OVER NETWORK NEUTRALITY
Although related issues arose during earlier proceedings in which the FCC
addressed calls for multiple ISP access to cable modem systems,28 the debate
over network neutrality began in earnest in February 2002 when the FCC issued
26. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
27. See Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
28. Many commentators asked the FCC to require cable operators to make their cable modem
systems available to all ISPs on a nondiscriminatory basis as part of the process of clearing a series of
major mergers in the cable television industry. The FCC vacillated, declining to impose such require-
ments in connection with AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne, imposing a multiple ISP access
requirement as a condition to clearing America Online’s acquisition of Time Warner, and then returning
to refusing to mandate multiple ISP access when evaluating Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable
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a notice of proposed rulemaking tentatively concluding that DSL systems were
“information services” and thus were not subject to the access requirements
imposed on traditional telephone companies.29 The following month, the FCC
issued a declaratory ruling drawing a similar conclusion with respect to cable
modem systems.30 In both cases, the FCC sought comment on what regulations,
if any, the FCC should impose under its general rulemaking authority.31
At the time, last-mile broadband providers had begun to experiment with a
variety of restrictions on the ways end users could use their network connec-
tions.32 Although there was no evidence that last-mile broadband providers
were blocking end user access to any content,33 some network owners began
employing tiered pricing schemes that forced heavy bandwidth users to pay
more for their connections34 and implementing technologies that slow down the
connections of users running bandwidth-intensive applications, such as file-
sharing programs.35 Other end user restrictions included prohibitions on end
users reselling bandwidth, acting as an Internet service provider (ISP), engaging
in home networking, attaching certain devices, operating file servers, and
employing commercial applications such as virtual private networks (VPNs).36
The emergence of end user restrictions alarmed traditional entertainment
properties. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitu-
tional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 1015–18 (2003).
29. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3029–35 ¶¶ 17–29 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline
Broadband NPRM]. The FCC’s action was antedated by some commentary expressing concerns about
end user restrictions. See Bar et al., supra note 4, at 509–14; Saltzer, supra note 4.
30. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4819–39 ¶¶ 33–71 (2002)
[hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM]. This declaratory ruling was preceded by a
notice of inquiry exploring these issues. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
Over Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19287 (2000).
31. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 30, at 4839–54 ¶¶ 72–112;
Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 29, at 3040–48 ¶¶ 43–64.
32. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.A.
33. See Peter J. Howe, News from the Chicago Cable and Telecom Show, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16,
2003, at C2 (quoting FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein acknowledging the lack of evidence that
last-mile providers were limiting end users’ ability to access content and calling network neutrality “‘a
solution awaiting a problem’”); Declan McCullagh, FCC Chief Dubious About New Cable Rules,
CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 18, 2003, http://news.com.com/FCCchiefdubiousaboutnewcablerules/
2100-1025_3-5065325.html?tagnl (quoting FCC Chairman Michael Powell as stating, “I don’t know
yet that I see anything that says we need a rulemaking on [network neutrality]”); Amy Schatz & Anne
Marie Squeo, Neutral Ground: As Web Providers’ Clout Grows, Fears Over Access Take Focus; FCC’s
Ruling Fuels Debate Between Broadband Firms and Producers of Content, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005,
at A1 (quoting FCC Chairman Kevin Martin as saying “‘We haven’t seen any evidence of this being a
problem’”); cf. Paul Kapustka, Former FCC Chairman Powell: Net Neutrality “Doing Great,”
NETWORKINGPIPELINE, Feb. 20, 2006, available at http://www.networkingpipeline.com/news/180204778
(quoting former FCC Chairman Michael Powell as saying that there were “no perceptible transgres-
sions” against network neutrality).
34. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35. See Roger Cheng, Online Services Move to Restrict Bandwidth Hogs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
2003, at B2.
36. See Wu, supra note 4, at 156–62.
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companies (such as Disney), providers of Internet-based applications (such as
Amazon.com, eBay, and Yahoo!), software companies (such as Microsoft), and
device manufacturers (such as Apple Computer and Dell). Together they formed
a number of industry consortia that proposed a series of “connectivity prin-
ciples” that would limit last-mile broadband providers’ ability to prevent end
users from accessing any content, running any applications, and attaching any
devices they desired, unless necessary to comply with a legal duty or to prevent
harm to the network.37 Legal scholars Lawrence Lessig and Timothy Wu filed
comments supporting a similar regime. Their approach would forbid last-mile
broadband providers from imposing restrictions on the way end users employ
their Internet connections, except as necessary to comply with legal duties,
prevent harm to the network or interference with other users, or ensure the
quality of broadband service.38 In 2004, then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell
called upon the industry to voluntarily embrace a series of “Internet freedoms”
that would ensure end users’ ability to access content, use applications, and
attach personal devices, subject only to restrictions needed to manage networks,
ensure quality experiences, prevent disruption of the network, and prevent theft
of service,39 although subsequent comments have made clear that Powell would
not support turning his Internet freedoms into a regulatory mandate.40 Concerns
about network neutrality were heightened still further when a small local
telephone company known as Madison River Communications blocked its DSL
customers from using the ports needed to access Internet telephony (also known
as Voice over Internet protocol or VoIP).41 Allegations of similar interruptions
of VoIP service by minor telephone companies have continued to appear,42
although network neutrality proponents concede that such reports remain “iso-
lated.”43
Further consideration of network neutrality was temporarily foreclosed by the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, which held that
the FCC’s declaratory ruling that cable modems represented an “information
37. See HTBC Comments, supra note 6, at 6–13. The HTBC’s proposal was later endorsed by the
CBUI. See CBUI Ex parte, supra note 6, at 3–4.
38. See Wu & Lessig, Ex parte, supra note 7, at 12–15. For statements of their views appearing in
the scholarly literature, see LESSIG, supra note 4, at 46–48, 156–59, and Wu, supra note 4, at 165–72.
39. See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, 3 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 5, 11–12 (2004). Chairman Powell also called for the industry to provide
consumers with clear and meaningful information regarding the terms of their broadband service plans.
Id. at 12.
40. See B2Day, Powell Warns Net Neutrologists Not to Be Naı̈ve, Apr. 3, 2006, http://
business2.blogs.com/business2blog/2006/04/powell_warns_ne.html.
41. See Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
42. See Tripp Blatz, Three Carriers Have Now Blocked Access to Ports for VoIP, Vonage Chairman
Alleges, TELECOMM. MONITOR, Aug. 23, 2005, available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/tcm.nsf/is/
A0B1J0D3P1.
43. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th
Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Prof. Lawrence Lessig) [hereinafter Lessig Testimony], available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf.
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service” was foreclosed by a previous Ninth Circuit decision.44 The Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and upheld the FCC’s
conclusion that cable modems constituted an information service that was not
subject to the regulatory regimes applied to telephony and cable television.45 In
the process, the Court indicated that the FCC possessed the authority to impose
additional regulatory requirements as it saw fit.46
The prospect that the FCC would once again begin addressing the issues
surrounding network neutrality touched off a paroxysm of lobbying at the FCC
and on Capitol Hill.47 Their efforts were partially successful. When adopting an
order ruling that DSL was exempt from the statutory access requirements
applied to traditional telephone companies, the FCC declined to invoke its
general regulatory jurisdiction to impose alternative access or nondiscrimination
requirements.48 At the same time, the FCC explicitly reserved the right to
impose access requirements should circumstances warrant doing so49 and issued
a policy statement recognizing the agency’s intent to preserve consumers’ rights
to access the content, run the applications, and attach the devices of their
choice.50
These steps were not sufficient to placate network neutrality proponents’
concerns. The policy statement recognized an exception for “reasonable net-
work management” and explicitly acknowledged that it has no legal effect until
incorporated into formal rules.51 In addition, the statement released by FCC
Chairman Kevin Martin in conjunction with the policy statement expressed his
confidence that competition would remain sufficiently robust that such regula-
tion would prove unnecessary.52 In subsequent statements, Chairman Martin
indicated that while he would oppose any attempt to completely block access to
particular content and applications, he would not oppose allowing networks to
charge content and applications providers for different tiers of service.53 The
continuing controversy ultimately became front-page news in The Wall Street
44. 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the FCC’s Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling was foreclosed by AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)).
45. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
46. Id. at 2708 (noting that “the Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on
facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction”).
47. See Cheryl Bolen, Entertainers Looking to Influence Next Telecommunications Act Update,
TELECOMM. MONITOR, July 19, 2005; Amy Schatz, FCC May Set Rules Allowing Bells Exclusive Access
Over DSL Lines, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at A4.
48. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14862–98 ¶¶ 12–85,
14904–05 ¶¶ 96–97 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Access Order].
49. See id. at 14904 ¶ 96.
50. Wireline Broadband Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 14988.
51. Id. at 14988 n.15.
52. FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, Comments on Commission Policy Statement 1 (Aug. 5, 2005),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf.
53. See Drew Clark, FCC Chief Opens Door to Tiered, High-Speed Internet, NAT’L J.’S INSIDER
UPDATE: THE TELECOM ACT, Jan. 6, 2006, http://www.njtelecomupdate.com/lenya/telco/live/tb-
FBRB1136842420157.html.
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Journal, which predicted that the issue will be of major concern when Congress
begins its impending overhaul of the communications laws.54 A number of
national media outlets have published editorials and opinion pieces on both
sides of the issue.55 The debate over network neutrality eventually led SBC,
AT&T, Verizon, and MCI to agree to adhere to principles of network neutrality
for two years in order to obtain FCC clearance of their mergers.56 In the
process, the two Democratic Commissioners issued statements lauding the
merging parties’ willingness to adhere to network neutrality, even if only for
two years, while the two Republican Commissioners filed statements question-
ing the need for additional restrictions.57 Network neutrality has subsequently
been the subject of extensive legislative negotiations. On the Senate side, the
Commerce Committee conducted hearings on network neutrality,58 although the
Committee remains deeply divided over the issue.59 On the House side, pro-
posed legislation with strong bipartisan support that included a network neutral-
ity provision unraveled, and House Republicans, with the support of a small
group of House Democrats, began to push forward a bill that did not contain a
network neutrality provision.60 The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
the Internet, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and the full House
each rejected amendments that would have added a broad network neutrality
mandate to the bill.61 Just before this Article went to press, the Senate Com-
54. See Schatz & Squeo, supra note 33.
55. For editorials favoring network neutrality, see Editorial, Congress Turns a Deaf Ear to Need for
Internet Neutrality, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 7, 2006, at A1; Editorial, Don’t Undercut Internet
Access, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 17, 2006, at B4; Editorial, Tollbooths on the Internet Highway, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2006, at A14; Editorial, Whose Internet Is It, Anyway?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MTR., Mar. 24, 2006, at
8; Steven Levy, When the Net Goes from Free to Fee, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 2006, at 14; Catherine Yang
et al., At Stake: The Net as We Know It, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 26, 2005, at 38.
For editorials opposing network neutrality, see Editorial, Stuck in Neutral, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2006,
at A20; Editorial, The Eden Illusion, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2006, at A14; Leslie Ellis, Network
Neutrality: Battle Royale, CED MAGAZINE, Apr. 2006, available at http://www.cedmagazine.com/article/
CA6319829.html; Julian Sanchez, A Neutral Panic: Why There’s No Need for New Laws to Keep the
Internet Open, REASON ONLINE, Apr. 10, 2006, available at http://www.reason.com/links/
links041006.shtml-.
56. See Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 11, at 18437 ¶ 3, 18492 ¶ 109, 18509 ¶ 143, 18537 ¶ 221;
SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 11, at 18293 ¶ 3, 18350–51 ¶ 108, 18368 ¶ 144, 18392 ¶ 211, app.F.
57. See Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 11, at 18570 (statement of Martin, Comm’r), 18572–73
(statement of Abernathy, Comm’r), 18575 (statement of Copps, Comm’r), 18579 (statement Adelstein,
Comm’r); SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 11, at 18422 (statement of Martin, Comm’r), 18424–25
(statement of Abernathy, Comm’r), 18427 (statement of Copps, Comm’r), 18431 (statement of Adel-
stein, Comm’r).
58. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
59. See David Hatch & Drew Clark, Stevens Says Commerce Panel Deeply Divided Over “Net
Neutrality,” NAT’L J.’S INSIDER UPDATE: THE TELECOM ACT, Mar. 20, 2006, http://www.njtelecomupdate.
com/lenya/telco/live/tb-PKMQ1142371107278.html.
60. See Drew Clark, Bipartisan Telecom Deal Unravels; Barton To Push GOP-Backed Bill, NAT’L
J.’S INSIDER UPDATE: THE TELECOM ACT, Mar. 24, 2006, http://www.njtelecomupdate.com/lenya/telco/live/
tb-ZMKJ1143232909756.html.
61. On April 5, 2006, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee voted 8-23 to reject a network neutrality amendment before
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merce Committee rejected a network neutrality amendment by a vote of eleven
to eleven.62 The amendment’s sponsors expect to reintroduce it when the bill is
debated on the floor of the full Senate.
II. SOURCES OF CONGESTION ON THE INTERNET
As is commonly known, the Internet is not a single network but rather a
network of interconnected networks. The FCC has found it useful to divide the
networks that comprise the Internet into three types.63 Backbone providers
provide high-speed, long-distance connections between a small number of
interconnection points.64 Middle-mile providers provide regional distribution
functions, carrying the traffic from the limited number of interconnection points
served by backbone providers to the local distribution facilities maintained by
last-mile providers in individual cities (which in the case of DSL is usually
called a “central office” and in the case of cable modem systems is usually
approving the bill by a vote of 27-4. See Tom Abate, Telecom Reform Moves Forward: House Panel
OKs Measure Favored by Phone Companies, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 2006, at C1. Three weeks later, the
full Committee also rejected a network neutrality amendment (by a vote of 22-34) before voting 42-12
to approve the entire bill. See Jim Puzzanghera, Panel Vote Shows Rift over “Net Neutrality,” L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at C1. The House Judiciary Committee voted 20-13 to approve a different bill that
would have incorporated network neutrality into the federal antitrust laws. See Marilyn Geewax, House
Panel OKs “Network Neutrality,” ATLANTA J.-CONST., May, 26, 2006, at G1. When the full House
debated the version of the legislation reported by the House Commerce Committee on June 8, it
rejected a network neutrality amendment offered by Rep. Edward Markey by a vote of 152-269 and
approving the entire bill by a vote of 321-101. See Stephen Labaton, House Backs Telecom Bill
Favoring Phone Companies, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at C3.
62. See Tom Abate, Net Neutrality Amendment Dies: Telecommunications Bill Goes to Senate
Without Provision Sought by Web Firms, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 2006, at C1.
63. See Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913,
20922–28 ¶¶ 18–28 (2000) [hereinafter Second Section 706 Report].
64. Originally, backbones only interconnected at the four public Network Access Points (NAPs)
created by the National Science Foundation (located in San Francisco, Chicago, New York, and
Washington, D.C.), as well as the Commercial Internet Exchange maintained in Santa Clara, California.
See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 5–6 (FCC Office of Plans
& Pol’y Working Paper No. 32, Sept. 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/
working_papers/oppwp32.pdf. The NAPs have since been privatized, and backbone providers have also
created a number of other public interconnection points, where any carrier can exchange traffic. In
addition, backbone providers have begun to exchange traffic directly through private interconnection
points. See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Broadband
Competition?: A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 31
(2004).
Depending on the context, the FCC sometimes replaces the term “backbone provider” with the term
long haul communications transport facilities to make clear that it is referring to high-speed fiber
transport used for voice as well as data communications. See Inquiry Considering the Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2853 n.33 (2002).
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called a “headend”).65 Last-mile providers convey the traffic from these local
distribution facilities to the premises of end users.66 The FCC has analogized
this to a road system. Backbones represent interstate highways, which convey
traffic at high speeds and allow entry and exit only through limited access
points. Middle-mile networks are the divided highways that connect interstate
exits to local roads. Last-mile networks are the local roads, responsible for
delivering traffic to the driveways leading into individual residences.67
Until recently, the protocols that govern the Internet have required that all of
these providers be organized into a series of parallel hierarchies, in which each
last-mile provider exchanged traffic with a dedicated middle-mile provider,
which in turn exchanged traffic with a dedicated backbone.68 Each type of
Internet provider in this chain must maintain some infrastructure for conveying
the stream of data packets, consisting of wires, fiber optic cable, or some other
medium of transmission. Each network must also have a number of computers
called routers, which operate in the core of the network to direct packets to their
destination. Computers that store files at the edge of the network and fulfill
requests for those files from other users are called servers.
The process can be illustrated by tracing the path of a typical Internet
transaction, such as downloading a webpage over a cable modem system. The
process begins when an end user employs its computer to submit a request for a
webpage. The end user’s computer divides the address of the requested web-
page into packets and forwards the packets to the cable modem provider serving
that end user. The packets travel through the coaxial cables connecting the end
user’s premises to a fiber node located in its neighborhood, which aggregates
65. Under broadband, middle-mile and last-mile provision is often vertically integrated. This is
because there are often real efficiencies that result from such integration. See Yoo, supra note 64, at
31–34.
66. See Second Section 706 Report, supra note 63, at 20923 ¶ 18, 20938–39 ¶ 60.
67. See id. at 20922–23 ¶ 18.
68. See Stanley M. Besen et al., Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agree-
ments, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 292, 292 (2001).
Figure 1: The Basic Architecture of the Internet
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those packets with other traffic and transmits them to the headend. A cable
modem termination system separates the data packets from the video stream and
directs them onto the data network maintained in the headend.69 The router on
the data network located in the headend transmits the packets to a middle-mile
provider, which in turn transmits the packets to one of the interconnection
points served by backbone providers. The backbone directs the packets to other
backbone providers until they reach the backbone connected to the middle-mile
provider that serves the destination.70 The middle-mile provider then directs the
packets to the terminating last-mile provider, which passes them on to the server
hosting the webpage content. The web server fulfills the request, and the
packets comprising the webpage returns through a similar set of steps.
Congestion results from the fact that the capacity of almost every step in this
process is constrained. For example, the bandwidth of each component of the
physical transmission media (e.g., the wires and fiber nodes comprising the
network) is limited.71 The number of packets and requests that routers and
content servers can fulfill at any time is similarly constrained. When data
packets arrive at a rate that exceeds the capacity of any particular element, they
form a queue. The resulting delay in the speed with which the requests are
fulfilled causes degradation in the quality of service provided by the network.
Changes in the ways people are using the Internet are making these problems
all the more acute. The Internet was once dominated by e-mail and other
applications that placed fairly modest demands on the network, and the restric-
tions imposed by the National Science Foundation on backbone services limited
the Internet to noncommercial uses. The subsequent privatization of the Internet
has greatly increased the number of network users as well as the heterogeneity
of network usage.72 These changes have increased the variability of demand in
69. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 28, at 1014–15 (offering a more detailed depiction of cable
modem systems).
70. The number of backbones involved depends on whether service is being provided under a
peering or a transit arrangement. Under peering arrangements, backbones only exchange traffic that
originates from the customer of one backbone and terminates with the customers of the other peered
backbone. In that case, the maximum number of backbones involved is two. Under transit arrange-
ments, backbones serve as intermediaries for traffic that neither originates from nor terminates with
their customers or the customers of their peering partners. In this case, the number of backbones
involved may exceed two. See Kende, supra note 64, at 5, 7.
71. In addition to congestion in backbone and middle-mile services, cable modem customers share
bandwidth both between the end users’ premises and the fiber node as well as between the fiber node
and the cable headend. As a result, both segments are subject to congestion. See Spulber & Yoo, supra
note 28, at 1014–15. DSL systems have historically used dedicated circuits that were less subject to
congestion. Telephone companies are increasingly deploying remote terminals that aggregate traffic and
convey them via fiber to their central office facility in a manner quite similar to the hybrid fiber-coaxial
architecture of most cable modem systems. See id. at 1004–05. To the extent that they employ remote
terminals, telephone networks may be subject to congestion effects between the remote terminal and the
central office that are similar to those suffered by cable modem systems between the fiber node and the
headend. The connection between the end users’ premises and the remote terminal continues to be
through dedicated wires that are not subject to congestion.
72. See Yoo, supra note 64, at 34–37.
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ways that have made problems of network management considerably more
complex.73 For example, the emergence of webpage downloading, which re-
quires the transfer of images and multimedia features, has increased the inten-
sity of bandwidth usage, as has the emergence of music filesharing and other
applications involving the transfer of increasingly large files. In addition, end
users are more frequently using applications that are sensitive to delay, such as
streaming media, online gaming, and VoIP. Thus, guaranteed throughput rates
have become increasingly important at the precise time that increases in the
volume of traffic are making quality of service harder to maintain. Indeed, some
technologists have increasingly come to regard the thirty-year old suite of
protocols around which Internet is currently designed (known as TCP/IP),
which routes packets on a first-come, first-served basis in precisely the manner
favored by network neutrality proponents, as an increasingly obsolete technol-
ogy that is ill-suited to increasingly varied and intense demands that end users
are placing on the network.74
III. THE ECONOMICS OF CONGESTION
The fact that the Internet is subject to congestion gives rise to a number of
important policy implications. Perhaps the most sophisticated insights into
congestion are provided by the branch of economics known as club goods,
which was largely inspired by the pioneering work of Nobel laureate James
Buchanan.75
Club goods are goods that can be shared by more than one person. At the
same time, they differ from infinitely shareable goods (known in the literature
as pure public goods) in that consumption by an additional person creates
73. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex
Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2005).
74. See, e.g., Carol Wilson, Point of No Return, TELEPHONY, Apr. 3, 2006, available at http://voip-
blog.tmcnet.com/blog/rich-tehrani/voip/point-of-no-return.html (quoting former FCC Chief Technolo-
gist and Carnegie Mellon Professor David Farber as stating that the current Internet architecture is
“getting old” and is increasingly unable to satisfy the demand for new functionality for new services
such as streaming video).
75. See James Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965). See generally
RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS
351–53 (2d ed. 1996) (reviewing the origins of the study of club goods). Buchanan’s work is related to
Charles Tiebout’s earlier work on local public goods, which analyzed shared resources provided by
local governments. Tiebout’s model assumed that cities attempt to achieve an optimal community size,
which is achieved when a city produces the bundle of services desired by residents at the lowest
average cost. The posited “U”-shape of the cost curve in turn presupposed the existence of some local
resource that was in fixed supply, such as a beach or the total amount of land available; otherwise, there
would be no logical reason to limit community size. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 419 (1956). Although Tiebout does not specify what causes
marginal cost to increase, it is analogous to the congestion costs assumed by the club goods literature.
The primary difference between club goods and local public goods is the feasibility of entry. The
former assumes that entry by new clubs is possible. The latter assumes that the total number of
municipalities is fixed. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Public Goods and the Invisible Hand, in MODERN
PUBLIC FINANCE 93, 95, 107 (John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994).
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congestion costs that cause the quality of the services provided to others to
deteriorate. Buchanan’s paradigmatic example of a club good is a swimming
pool.76 Others have suggested that the theory also applies to a wide range of
facilities, including golf courses, theaters, laundromats, restaurants,77 and roads.78
A. CONGESTION AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN FLAT-RATE AND USAGE-SENSITIVE PRICING
One of the primary issues that has emerged in the literature is whether a club
should charge a single flat-rate price for membership or whether it should
charge a price that varies with the intensity of each member’s usage of the club
facilities. The standard result is that reliance solely on flat-rate pricing will
result in inefficiently high levels of congestion and in overconsumption of the
club facilities.79
The intuitions underlying this result are quite straightforward. Economic
welfare is maximized if the market reaches equilibrium at the point where the
social benefits equal the social costs. In the case of club goods, this would occur
where the benefits each club member derives from the last unit consumed
equals the costs of congestion created by the last unit consumed. The problem is
that if club members are charged rates that are not sensitive to usage, the private
cost of consuming an additional unit is zero. That means that utility-maximizing
club members will increase their consumption of club resources until the
marginal utility from any further increases in usage is zero, at which point the
social costs associated with the last unit consumed will exceed the benefits, and
welfare is reduced.
In short, flat-rate pricing results in excessive consumption of club resources,
which arises because the congestion costs represent a negative externality that
individual club members responsible for causing the congestion are not forced
to bear. The classic solution is to impose a usage-sensitive price that is equal to
the congestion costs imposed by the last unit consumed. In this way, usage-
sensitive pricing aligns incentives by bringing private costs into line with the
true social costs of consuming an additional unit.80 As a theoretical matter,
76. See Buchanan, supra note 75, at 1.
77. See, e.g., Robin Boadway, A Note on the Market Provision of Club Goods, 13 J. PUB. ECON. 131,
131 (1980).
78. See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545, 555–57
(2004).
79. See, e.g., Berglas, supra note 19, at 119; Eitan Berglas, The Market Provision of Club Goods
Once Again, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 389, 393 (1981); Suzanne Scotchmer, Two-Tier Pricing of Shared
Facilities in a Free-Entry Equilibrium, 16 RAND J. ECON. 456, 457 (1985).
80. Within each club, each member will calibrate their consumption until the utility they derive is
equal. There may initially be some variation in per capita utility across clubs, with some clubs being
more crowded than others. Assuming that mobility across clubs is possible, people in high-congestion
clubs will seek to shift to low-congestion clubs until utility is equalized across all clubs. Furthermore,
club goods theory posits the existence of an optimal club size. On the one hand, increasing club size
benefits members by allowing them to amortize the overhead costs needed to establish the club and to
enforce exclusion over a larger membership base. On the other hand, any increase in membership
causes congestion costs to rise. Clubs thus add members until the benefits of spreading costs over an
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usage-sensitive pricing has thus been regarded as a critical mechanism for
promoting the efficient allocation of resources.
B. THE IMPACT OF TRANSACTION COSTS ON THE CHOICE BETWEEN FLAT-RATE AND
USAGE-SENSITIVE PRICING
The preference for usage-sensitive pricing suggested by the theoretical litera-
ture on club goods is subject to a number of limiting assumptions and condi-
tions. Many of these caveats are not relevant to the network neutrality debate.81
One caveat that is applicable, however, is that the standard result depends on the
assumption that exclusion and metering is costless.82 A literature has emerged
relaxing this assumption and exploring the results that obtain when metering
and exclusion require the incurrence of transaction costs. It draws on the insight
that someone buying ten units of a good is indifferent between a price of $1 per
unit and a $10 entry fee with a ten-unit limit per customer. In other words, the
equilibrium under usage-sensitive pricing can be replicated by charging a
additional member no longer exceed the marginal increase in congestion costs, at which point they will
stop adding new members. Assuming free entry, any remaining individuals refused membership in
existing clubs remain free to form new clubs. The result is an equilibrium in which the optimal number
of clubs exists and in which each club member consumes the optimal amount of club services. See
Buchanan, supra note 75, at 3–5, 8–9. Subsequent work has confirmed this result regardless of whether
the market structure is monopolistic, oligopolistic, or competitive. See MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra
note 20, at 1143, 1147 (competitive and monopolistic); P.S. Calem & Daniel F. Spulber, Multiproduct
Two-Part Tariffs, 2 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 105 (1984) (oligopolistic).
81. For example, as a purely formal matter, a club good equilibrium is only stable if dividing the
overall population by the optimal club size results in an integer. When that occurs, the solution is said to
be in the core, which in turn implies that the equilibrium is Pareto optimal, in that no individual or set
of individuals can improve their situation by forming a different club. A noninteger result destabilizes
the equilibrium, however, since anyone excluded from club membership will have the incentive to
attempt to bid their way into a club by offering to accept a lower payoff than a current club member.
The result is a constant shuffling of club composition. See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Clubs, Commonality
and the Core: An Integration of Game Theory and the Theory of Public Goods, 34 ECONOMICA 314
(1967). Fortunately, introduction of a concept known as the approximate core renders the nonexistence
of an equilibrium less problematic than initially appears. If the number of club members is large
relative to the number of nonmembers, club members can make side payments to nonmembers in order
to induce them not to destabilize the existing coalitions. The resulting utilities lie fairly close to core
utilities. See, e.g., Myrna H. Wooders, The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Goods
Economies, 48 ECONOMETRICA 1467 (1980).
Another limiting factor is that the classic analysis of club goods assumes that consumer preferences
are homogeneous. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 75, at 6, 8. If preferences are heterogeneous, each
homogeneous subset of the population should partition itself into homogeneous clubs. See Eitan
Berglas & David Pines, Clubs, Local Public Goods, and Transportation Models: A Synthesis, 15 J. PUB.
ECON. 141, 150–52 (1981); Martin McGuire, Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 112 (1974); Mark V. Pauly, Cores and Clubs, 9 PUB. CHOICE 53 (1970). If integer problems
prevent the total population from segregating itself into homogeneous clubs, individuals with different
preferences may have to form a mixed club. The resulting intraclub heterogeneity can lead to
suboptimal provision. See Berglas & Pines, supra, at 150–52. Later work has shown that mixed clubs
may be optimal so long as crowding is anonymous and members’ demands for facility size and
congestion coincide at a feasible division of total economy-wide endowments. See Suzanne Scotchmer
& Myrna Holtz Wooders, Competitive Equilibrium and the Core in Club Economies with Anonymous
Crowding, 34 J. PUB. ECON. 159 (1987).
82. See Helsley & Strange, supra note 21, at 889, 895–96.
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flat-rate price set equal to the unit price under usage-sensitive pricing times the
optimal number of units consumed.83 Given the identity of these two pricing
mechanisms, providers are free to choose the pricing regime that imposes the
fewest transaction costs. Thus, if the transaction costs of metering and exclusion
are sufficiently high, charging a flat-rate pricing based on the contribution to
congestion by the average club member may well prove economically superior
to usage-sensitive pricing.84
The FCC’s initial order implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996
recognized that transaction costs can render flat-fee pricing of congestible
resources efficient. One of the primary purposes of the 1996 Act was to foster
the development of competition in local telephone services. As competition for
local services emerged, some calls would inevitably originate on one company’s
local telephone network and terminate on the local telephone facilities of
another company. In the process, both the originating and terminating carrier
would incur costs. Because local telephone service in the United States has
traditionally operated on a “caller pays” basis, only the originating carrier
would generate revenue from the call. As a result, the 1996 Act mandates that
the FCC establish a system of “reciprocal compensation” through which originat-
ing carriers could compensate other carriers for the costs they incurred terminat-
ing their calls.85 The statute provides for reciprocal compensation based on a
reasonable approximation of the costs incurred by each carrier.86 The statute
specifically provides that it should not be construed to preclude bill-and-keep
arrangements, in which each carrier recovers its costs from its own customers
without receiving any additional payment from the other carrier.87
In implementing these provisions, the FCC expressed skepticism about bill-
and-keep, based largely on the concern that failing to compensate terminating
carriers for their costs might give originating carriers both the ability and the
incentive to impose costs onto terminating carriers. As with club goods, the
concern is that the resulting externalization of costs can lead to overutilization
83. See Barro & Romer, supra note 21, at 875–79.
84. See id. at 879; Helsley & Strange, supra note 21, at 895–96. It is worth noting that the analyses
that found flat-rate pricing preferable to usage-sensitive pricing assumed perfect information. See
Helsley & Strange, supra note 21, at 893. When information is imperfect, the presence of transaction
costs can lead to an adverse selection problem in which high demanders patronize facilities designed
for low demanders. In such cases, no equilibrium may exist, and any equilibrium that does exist is
inefficient. See Lee, supra note 21, at 338, 359.
In addition, existing analyses take capacity as given. Although per capita usage will be higher under
flat-rate pricing, models that take capacity as endogenous also point out that capacity will be higher as
well. As a result, the net impact on congestion is ultimately ambiguous and depends on which of these
effects dominates. The problem becomes even more complex if one acknowledges that flat-rate pricing
can cause the number of users to change as well. If users can shift to alternative providers of network
services, adopting a flat-rate price will cause the customer base to consist solely of a small group of
intensive users with a high tolerance for congestion. See MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra note 20, at
1145–47.
85. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (2000).
86. See id. § 252(d(2)(A).
87. See id. § 252(d)(2)(B).
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of the terminating carrier’s resources. As a general matter, the FCC thus
regarded bill-and-keep regimes as “not economically efficient.”88
At the same time, the FCC acknowledged that circumstances may exist under
which bill-and-keep may make economic sense. If the traffic exchanged be-
tween carriers is roughly symmetrical, the compensation that each carrier would
pay the other for terminating its calls would simply offset one another. When
that is the case, eliminating usage-sensitive pricing would not have any signifi-
cant adverse impact on the carriers. At the same time, it might yield economic
benefits by allowing both carriers to avoid the administrative burdens and
transaction costs needed to create and implement metering regimes.89 In other
words, the presence of transaction costs may well make flat-rate pricing the
preferred institutional arrangement.
Indeed, historical patterns suggest that bill-and-keep may make economic
sense even when the traffic exchanged between carriers is not symmetrical.
Similar compensation issues were posed long prior to the enactment of the 1996
Act by the existence of independent (i.e., non-Bell) local telephone companies
operating in the same local calling areas as AT&T. Perhaps the most prominent
example of this situation is the simultaneous provision of local telephone
service by GTE and Pacific Bell to adjacent neighborhoods in Los Angeles. Just
as was the case with local telephone providers under the 1996 Act, these carriers
needed some mechanism for compensating each other for the costs of terminat-
ing calls that originated on the other’s network. Interestingly, these carriers
generally relied on bill-and-keep as the mechanism for settling interconnection
costs despite the fact that the size of their customer bases was far from
symmetrical.90 The implication is that the transaction cost economies associated
88. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16055 ¶ 1112 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition
Order].
89. See id.
90. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2.4.1, at 174–75 (2d ed. 1999).
The economics of bill-and-keep do not appear to require symmetry in total traffic. Instead it is sufficient
if the number of calls each carrier originates roughly equals the number of calls it terminates. When
each carrier’s originations and terminations are balanced and the pattern of calls is evenly distributed
across the customer base, bill-and-keep is efficient even if the total traffic generated by one carrier is
much larger than the total traffic generated by the other.
The point is most easily understood through the following example. Suppose that two local networks
operate in the same area, with the incumbent carrier serving 900 customers and the new entrant serving
100 customers. Each customer makes ten calls randomly distributed throughout the entire customer
base. One would expect the customers of the dominant carrier to initiate 9000 calls. Ninety percent (or
8100) of those calls would terminate on the incumbent’s network, while ten percent (900) would
terminate on the new entrant’s network. At the same time, one would expect the new entrant’s
customers to place 1000 calls, ten percent (100) of which would terminate on the new entrant’s network
and ninety percent (900) of which would terminate on the dominant carrier’s network. Thus, if
originations and termination are symmetric and randomly distributed, 900 calls would pass from the
incumbent’s network to the new entrant’s network, and the same number of calls would pass in the
other direction. Under these circumstances, metering actual usage would provide no economic benefits
even though the total traffic handled by each network would be far from balanced. Note that a far
different situation holds if the distribution of calls is not random. In addition, the symmetry of
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with avoiding metering costs outweighed what little benefit that would have
resulted from a more accurate accounting of the actual traffic flows.
Indeed, transaction costs can help explain another one of the persistent
puzzles of telecommunications pricing, which is the persistence of flat-rate
pricing for local telephone service. Local telephone service in the U.S. has not
historically been priced on a usage-sensitive basis. Instead, subscribers can
place unlimited local calls for a flat monthly fee.91 Economists have long
theorized that the fact that local calling was unmetered at the margin was
inducing customers to make excessive calls and that usage-sensitive pricing
would lead to “modest” welfare gains.92 It is for this reason that some local
telephone companies began experimenting with usage-sensitive pricing regimes
generally known as “local measured service” (LMS).
The economics of congestion arguably suggest that LMS would eventually
emerge as the dominant pricing regime, and yet network providers, regulators,
and consumers all failed to embrace LMS. Acceptance of LMS was deterred in
part because of the magnitude of the transaction costs needed to meter local
telephone service.93 The available data suggest that the transaction costs associ-
ated with metering and billing for local telephone service may well be substan-
tial. Studies conducted several years ago indicate that the costs of metering and
billing represent more than 50% of the costs associated with an incremental call
and roughly 100% of the incremental cost of a nonpeak call,94 with the total
cost to the industry exceeding $10 billion.95
The problem is further complicated by the nature of congestion on communi-
cations networks. When total network usage is relatively low and network
resources are slack, the costs associated with incremental usage approach zero.
It is only when demand peaks that congestion costs become significant.96 As a
terminations and originations does not hold if one carrier only terminates calls, such as would occur for
carriers providing service to paging service providers, call centers, or Internet service providers. In that
case, the resulting asymmetry on a caller-pays system would lead to substantial distortions. See Local
Competition Order, supra note 88, at 16043 ¶ 1092.
91. See Local Competition Order, supra note 88, at 16055 ¶ 1112. This situation contrasts with the
rate practice of much of the rest of the world, which generally employs usage-based pricing for local
telephone service.
92. See Bridger M. Mitchell, Optimal Pricing of Local Telephone Service, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 517,
533 (1978).
93. See Michael A. Crew & Robert D. Dansby, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Local Measured Service, in
REGULATORY REFORM AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 35, 41, 45 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1982); James Griffin &
Thomas Mayor, The Welfare Gain from Efficient Pricing of Local Telephone Service, 30 J.L. & ECON.
465, 471 (1987); Alfred E. Kahn & William B. Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regula-
tion: Pricing, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 191, 232–34, 235–36 (1987); G. Franklin Mathewson & G. David
Quirin, Metering Costs and Marginal Cost Pricing in Public Utilities, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
335 (1972); Mitchell, supra note 92, at 517; Lee W. Selwyn, Perspectives on Usage-Sensitive Pricing,
PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, May 7, 1981, at 15.
94. See MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra note 24, at 263.
95. See Tim Wilson, Billing Systems Market Reaps Huge Growth: How Telecom Carriers Handle
Phone Bills Can Make or Break Their Customer Base, TELEPATH, Jan. 5, 1998, at T15.
96. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 73, at 1712.
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result, a first-best solution would require imposing a form of peak-load pricing
in which the usage charge at any particular moment varies with network
elements being used and the level of demand being placed on those elements.97
Thus, as a theoretical matter, economic efficiency would require that prices vary
with each local exchange and would vary from one moment to the next
depending on the particular level of network demand.98 As a practical matter,
however, the inability to make such minute adjustments prevents networks from
charging prices that are precisely calibrated toward actual usage. Instead,
network owners typically divide the day into peak and off-peak periods and
charge uniform prices during those periods that exceed the true congestion costs
of the lower-volume segments of the period and that fall short of the true
congestion costs of the higher-volume segments of the period. Variations in
demand within those periods inevitably lead to some degree of economic
inefficiency, since the uniformity of prices during the period will deter efficient
calls during the low-volume segments of the period and will not deter inefficient
calls during the high-volume segments of the period. The welfare losses created
by these imperfections in the pricing regime become another source of ineffi-
ciency that offsets the welfare benefits of usage-sensitive pricing.99 The combi-
nation of transaction costs and the inefficiency caused by the inability to
precisely tailor prices to current demand may be sufficient to render usage-
based pricing uneconomical.
In addition, networks are complex systems that can adapt in ways that are
hard to predict. For example, increasing a particular flow through a saturated
network element by ten percent will not necessarily reduce the carrying capacity
of the network by ten percent, since the network may be able to compensate by
rerouting traffic through other paths. Networks’ ability to compensate for
changes in network flows can cause the elements that are saturated to shift in
discontinuous ways that greatly complicate determining the precise impact of
increasing a network flow at any particular time.100 Customers’ aversion to
complex pricing regimes further limits networks’ ability to implement usage-
sensitive prices.101 Furthermore, the fact that capacity expansion typically takes
time and is subject to indivisibilities dictates that capacity will generally be
97. For leading analyses of peak-load pricing, see generally, for example, Marcel Boiteux, La
Tarification des demande en pointe: application de la théorie de la Vente au coût marginal [Peak-Load
Pricing: An Application of the Theory of Sale at Marginal Cost], 58 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE L’ELECTRICITÉ
321 (1949), translated as M. Boiteux, Peak-Load Pricing, 33 J. BUS. 157 (H.W. Izzard trans., 1960);
Peter O. Steiner, Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing, 71 Q.J. ECON. 585 (1957); Oliver E. Williamson,
Peak-Load Pricing and Optimality Constraints under Indivisibility Constraints, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 810
(1966).
98. See Kahn & Shew, supra note 93, at 237–38.
99. See ROLLA EDWARD PARK & BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, OPTIMAL PEAK-LOAD PRICING FOR LOCAL
TELEPHONE CALL 6, 32 (Rand Paper No. R-3404-1-RC March 1987); Kahn & Shew, supra note 93, at
232–34, 235–36.
100. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 73, at 1703–06.
101. See Larry Garfinkle, Usage Sensitive Pricing: Studies of a New Trend, TELEPHONY, Feb. 10,
1975, at 24, 28.
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added before it is needed. In addition, networks always maintain a certain level
of excess capacity to insure against unexpected surges in demand. As a result,
the network will always appear slack even when the excess capacity is simply a
reflection of proper network management.102
The impracticality of designing a pricing regime that was precisely calibrated
to the actual congestion costs associated with an incremental call led carriers
implementing LMS to adopt pricing regimes that broke the day into three
discrete periods: peak, near peak (called “shoulder rates”), and off peak.103
Empirical studies of these experiments have split on the economic impact of
LMS.104 Some have concluded that the combination of metering costs and the
misincentives created by the inability to set prices precisely equal to congestion
costs were sufficient to render LMS uneconomical.105 Others have concluded
that adoption of LMS would enhance economic welfare,106 although even those
favoring LMS concede that any such gains were modest.107 The failure of LMS
to yield clear welfare benefits demonstrates how transaction costs can render
deviating from usage-based pricing uneconomical.
Interestingly, wireless telephone pricing has moved in the opposite direction.
When cellular telephones first appeared, carriers tended to charge subscribers on
a strict, per-minute basis. Thus, as a theoretical matter, the wireless industry
began with a pricing regime that was a model of usage sensitivity. Over time,
wireless carriers began to relax their initial approach to pricing in two ways.
First, they tended to sell peak minutes in bundles, so that incremental usage was
not fully metered. Second, carriers began to allow subscribers to use off-peak
minutes for free. The wireless industry’s abandonment of an established usage-
based pricing regime in favor of one with flat-rate characteristics again attests to
the complexity created by the presence of significant transaction costs.
These conclusions are not unassailable by any means. For example, it is quite
possible that the replacement of mechanical switches with first electrical and
later digital switches has dramatically lowered the transaction costs of metering
usage.108 In addition, the persistence of usage-based pricing of local telephone
service in other countries109 raises questions of the universality of the benefits
of flat-rate pricing. My argument does not, however, depend on any definitive
102. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 73, at 1712–13, 1720.
103. See PARK & MITCHELL, supra note 99, at 1–2, 26–27, 29; Griffin & Mayor, supra note 93, at
472–73. Near-peak rates are necessary to avoid creating new demand peaks adjacent to the peak-load
period as consumers redistribute the timing of their purchases to avoid peak-load prices. See Boiteux,
supra note 97, at 173–74.
104. See Kahn & Shew, supra note 93, at 235, 237–38 (collecting sources); Steve G. Parsons, The
Economic Necessity of an Increased Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) in Telecommunications, 48 ADMIN.
L. REV. 227, 238 n.38 (1996) (same).
105. See PARK & MITCHELL, supra note 99, at 32–34.
106. See Griffin & Mayor, supra note 93, at 482.
107. See Kahn & Shew, supra note 93, at 237.
108. See id. at 236; David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications:
Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 125 (1994).
109. See supra note 91.
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resolution of these debates. The sheer variety of approaches to pricing local
telephone service underscores the difficulty in determining whether the transac-
tion costs are of sufficient magnitude to render usage-sensitive pricing uneco-
nomical and demonstrates the potential benefits from allowing network owners
to experiment with different institutional arrangements. Nor is local telephone
service the only prominent instance in which communications networks have
relied on flat-rate pricing. Consider the terms under which the Internet back-
bones exchange traffic. Backbones that are able to meet minimum traffic
volumes exchange traffic through a system known as peering, under which the
backbones do not charge each other for terminating traffic. In other words,
top-tier backbones employ a pricing system that is equivalent to bill-and-keep
systems for reciprocal compensation for terminating local telephone calls.
Backbones unable to meet these minimum volume requirements enter into
transit arrangements, under which they pay other backbones to terminate their
traffic.110 Backbones too small to peer with top-tier backbones have begun to
avoid paying transit costs by entering into secondary peering arrangements
with one another, which has helped to create a richer, less hierarchical set of
interconnection arrangements that has weakened the dominant position of the
top-tier backbones.111
This brief analysis reveals how transaction cost considerations have caused
backbone providers to enter into a wide diversity of pricing arrangements,
including many that do not depend on usage. The FCC has taken the existence
of peering as an indication that flat-rate pricing regimes may at times prove
economical.112 At the same time, the fact that backbones limit peering to other
backbones of similar size does suggest the existence of circumstances under
which the preferred pricing regime will be more usage sensitive.113
110. See Kende, supra note 64, at 5–7, 16–17; Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame
on You—Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet
Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 148 (2001); James B. Speta, A
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 232 (2002).
111. See Besen et al., supra note 68, at 292, 295. In addition, the development of a practice known
as multihoming, in which middle-mile providers interconnect with more than one backbone has reduced
the market power of core backbone providers still further. See id.
112. See Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
16 F.C.C.R. 9610, 9627 ¶ 43 (2001) [hereinafter Intercarrier Compensation NPRM].
113. Symmetry in traffic exchanged costs may not provide the only explanation for backbone
peering. The Internet depends on some ISPs generating complete routing tables for the Internet, in order
to avoid circularity problems in which links simply direct traffic along paths that feed back into
themselves. The transaction costs of coordinating routing tables goes up as the number of core
backbones increases. This suggests the existence of an optimal number of core backbones exchanging
traffic on a settlement-free basis. This also suggests that other networks must be charged for terminating
traffic in order to prevent them from free riding on the core backbones’ efforts to maintain complete
routing tables. See Paul Milgrom et al., Competitive Effects of Internet Peering Policies, in THE
INTERNET UPHEAVAL 175, 179–85 (Ingo Vogelsang & Benjamin M. Compaine eds., 2000).
Limiting peering to large backbones may also be designed to minimize another type of free riding.
For example, backbones that interconnect on a settlement-free basis would prefer coast-to-coast traffic
to travel on their peering partners’ network to the greatest extent possible. This would mean that they
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These examples have prompted the FCC to soften its traditional hostility
toward flat-rate pricing and to initiate a number of proceedings exploring
broader use of pricing regimes that are not usage sensitive. For example, the
FCC had tentatively concluded in 1996 that wireless providers should intercon-
nect with wireline providers on a bill-and-keep basis.114 In drawing this conclu-
sion, it noted studies indicating that the transaction costs of metering the
termination of traffic were sufficiently high to make bill-and-keep the more
economically efficient pricing regime.115 This effort ended when the FCC opted
to fold wireless-to-wireline interconnection into the proceeding to implement
the interconnection provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.116
The FCC’s interest in non-usage-sensitive pricing has continued to grow.
Prompted by a pair of in-house studies supporting broader use of bill-and-keep
regimes117 and by the prevalence of peering regimes for backbone interconnec-
tion and flat-rate pricing for residential local telephone service,118 the FCC has
begun exploring whether bill-and-keep can serve as the basis for reforming the
entire regime of intercarrier compensation.119 In the process, the FCC specifi-
cally sought and received comments on whether transaction costs might justify
flat-rate pricing.120
would hand off traffic that they originate at the earliest possible interconnection point and would accept
traffic that they terminate at the latest possible interconnection point. In other words, a backbone
carrying traffic from New York to Silicon Valley would like to hand it off as early as possible and have
the traffic travel across the country on its partner’s backbone. Conversely, the same backbone handling
traffic heading in the other direction would like the traffic to be handed off as late as possible so that
again the burden of carrying the traffic falls upon its peering partner. In order to avoid this type of free
riding, backbones have adopted a practice known as “hot potato routing,” in which each backbone
delivers packets bound for another backbone at the nearest possible interconnection point. A backbone
could defeat the benefits of hot potato routing simply by maintaining a relatively small number of
interconnection points located close to its customers. This possibility makes it logical for backbones to
limit peering arrangements to those backbones large enough to maintain a presence at each of the major
backbone interconnection points. See id. at 186; Kende, supra note 64, at 18–19.
114. See Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 5020 (1996).
115. Id. at 5038 ¶ 36.
116. See Local Competition Order, supra note 88, at 16005–07 ¶¶ 1023–1026.
117. See Jay M. Atkinson & Christopher C. Barkenov, A Competitively Neutral Approach to
Network Interconnection (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y Working Paper No. 34, Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp34.pdf; Patrick DeGraba, Bill and Keep at the
Central Office as an Efficient Interconnection Regime (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y Working Paper No.
33, Dec. 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp33.pdf.
118. See Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 112, at 9615 ¶¶ 9–10.
119. See id. at 9624–45 ¶¶ 37–97 (seeking comment on replacing all aspects of intercarrier
compensation with bill-and-keep); Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 4685 (2005) [hereinafter Intercarrier Compensation
Further NPRM] (seeking comment on specific industry proposals submitted in response to the FCC’s
request for comments on imposing bill-and-keep).
120. See Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 112, at 9628 ¶ 51; Intercarrier Compensation
Further NPRM, supra note 119, at 4700 ¶ 30.
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C. COASEAN PROXIES AS AN OVERLOOKED SOLUTION TO CONGESTION
Although incorporating transaction cost considerations has yielded important
insights into the choice between flat-rate and usage-sensitive pricing, the analy-
sis remains incomplete. The problem is that framing the issue as a choice
between flat-rate and usage-sensitive pricing fails to take into account the full
range of possible institutional forms. In particular, it overlooks the possibility
that transaction costs can also be avoided by identifying and charging for
another good that can be metered more cheaply and that can serve as a
reasonable proxy for usage of the good that needs to be metered.
This solution is suggested by Ronald Coase’s classic critique of lighthouses
as pure public goods.121 Lighthouses have long been regarded as posing a
paradigmatic example of a market failure in need of governmental redress.122
The standard account posits that the fact that the difficulties that lighthouse
owners face in securing payment from ships that benefit from the services they
provide prevents lighthouse owners from generating sufficient revenue to cover
their costs. Restated in terms relevant for our purposes, the difficulties in
metering the usage of lighthouse services introduce an externality that creates a
wedge between private and social net product. The resulting distortion in the
market for lighthouse services caused by the presence of metering costs is
generally regarded as providing a classic case for governmental intervention.
Coase rebutted this account by pointing out that throughout most of the 17th
and 18th centuries British lighthouses were operated by private, profit-making
enterprises. Lighthouse owners were able to finance their lighthouses through
tolls collected at nearby ports, since presumably only those ships that were
preparing to enter port would come close enough to shore to have need of the
lighthouse’s services. Port usage thus represented an easily metered proxy for
determining which ships had benefited from the services of the nearby light-
house. The historical record suggests that this system was quite successful. As
of 1820, thirty-four of the forty-six lighthouses in existence had been built by
private individuals. Over time, these private lighthouses began to be taken over
by a quasi-governmental organization known as Trinity House. Even after being
acquired by Trinity House, they continued to be privately financed through user
fees rather than through tax revenues.123
Coase’s analysis of lighthouse financing suggests that framing the debate
over congestion pricing as a choice between flat-rate and usage-sensitive pricing
overlooks the full range of possible pricing arrangements. Although later schol-
121. See Coase, supra note 22.
122. For classic references to this proposition, see 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1847), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 968 (J.M. Robson ed.,
1965); A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183–84 (4th ed. 1948); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 406 (3d ed. 1901). For more modern references, see PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 159 n.1 (6th ed. 1964); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 102 (1986).
123. See Coase, supra note 22, at 363–68.
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ars have disputed the specifics of his analysis,124 it still serves as a useful
illustration of the benefits of thinking more broadly about alternative institu-
tional solutions to the problems of exclusion. In the process, it demonstrates
how public policy might be better served if providers of club goods were given
the latitude to explore the use of proxies that minimize transaction costs while
incorporating some of the positive features benefits associated with usage-
sensitive pricing.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGESTION ECONOMICS FOR NETWORK NEUTRALITY
In this section, I apply the analytical framework developed above to the
network neutrality debate. It reveals that economic justifications may exist for
many of the practices criticized by network neutrality proponents. Although
these restrictions would place some limits on end users’ ability to run applica-
tions, access content, and attach devices as they see fit, they can also provide a
new way to internalize the congestion costs that high-volume users impose on
others. They can also create consumer benefits by reducing the congestion costs
and by lowering the access prices that low-volume end users must pay. Al-
though network neutrality proponents have suggested that mandating network
neutrality is essential to preserving the environment for innovation on the
Internet, a close examination of the economic literature reveals that such
arguments are misplaced in the context of physical networks like the Internet,
because the network owner has both the ability and the incentive to internalize
any spillover benefits associated with innovative activity.
Shifting to a view that end user restrictions can actually promote consumer
welfare would parallel the historical development of antitrust doctrine with
respect to vertical integration, which transformed antitrust doctrine from a
vision of competition that favored the independence of purchasers and traders to
buy and sell in an open market into one considerably more hospitable towards
vertical integration. Given the similarities between these two situations, the
lessons of vertical integration would seem to apply with equal force to network
neutrality.
A. THE ROLE OF USE RESTRICTIONS AND ACCESS TIERING IN MANAGING CONGESTION
The economic attractiveness of employing usage-sensitive pricing on the
Internet turns on the nature of congestion and the magnitude of the transaction
costs needed to implement such a scheme. The standard result is that in the
absence of transaction costs, economic welfare would be maximized if the price
of incremental usage of network services were set equal to the contribution of
124. See Richard A. Epstein, The Libertarian Quartet, REASON, Jan. 1999, at 64, available at
http://reason.com/9901/bk.re.thelibertarian.shtml; Andrew Odlyzko, The Evolution of Price Discrimina-
tion in Transportation and Its Implications for the Internet, 3 REV. NETWORK ECON. 323, 325–27 (2004);
David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons of the Lighthouse: “Government” or “Private” Provision of Goods,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1993).
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that incremental usage to network congestion. If transaction costs are suffi-
ciently high, it may well prove more economical to allow network providers to
pursue alternative pricing regimes.
Because Internet-based communications operate on fundamentally different
principles, the transaction costs associated with metering Internet traffic are
likely to be even more significant than those associated with local telephone
service. The protocol that comprises the Internet breaks every piece of communi-
cation into smaller packets that are transmitted individually and reassembled at
their destination. In addition, the Internet is connectionless, in that it does not
establish a closed, dedicated circuit between the originating and the terminating
computers. Instead, each packet is allowed to move independently. Because
routing tables are updated dynamically, it is possible for different packets from
the same communications to pass through different routes on the way to their
destination. As a result, multiple records are required to account for every
Internet-based communication. Indeed, the number of records needed to account
for the packets associated with a ten-minute telephone call over the Internet
could number in the tens of thousands.125 Consequently, the industry has
struggled to develop workable methods for metering Internet usage.126
At the same time, the increasingly varied and intense demands that end users
are placing on the network and the rise of applications that are more sensitive to
variations in throughput rates have made the need for managing congestion all
the more acute.127 Furthermore, since any impact of the congestion costs
imposed by a particular user depends upon the volume and pattern of other
traffic being carried by the network, congestion only begins to degrade service
when the aggregate traffic levels cause individual network elements to approach
saturation. A properly calibrated usage-based pricing regime might therefore
need to employ a complex version of peak-load pricing.128 In addition, usage-
based pricing is further complicated by the fact that modern applications often
access network resources autonomously, which limits end users’ ability to
exercise control over their total bandwidth usage.
It is thus quite plausible that the transaction costs needed to establish and run
a properly calibrated usage-based pricing regime would be sufficiently large
enough to make alternative pricing arrangements economically desirable. Further-
more, even if metering is economical in the long run, the inevitable lag in
creating such a metering system may lead Internet providers to rely on alterna-
tive institutional arrangements on a transitional basis.
The significance of these transaction costs reveals why Internet providers
might be interested in experimenting with alternative ways to manage the costs
of congestion by forcing those who consume large amounts of bandwidth to
125. See MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra note 24, at 263.
126. See Wilson, supra note 95.
127. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21–22 (2005).
128. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 73, at 1703–07, 1712–13.
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bear the costs created by their actions. From this perspective, it would be quite
sensible for providers to charge higher prices to those who engage in bandwidth-
intensive activities. If enforcement of these bandwidth limits proves too costly,
it may prove more efficient to prohibit certain bandwidth-intensive applications
altogether. Indeed, a close analysis of the specific provisions criticized by
network neutrality proponents suggest that last-mile providers have experi-
mented with tiered pricing and use restrictions in precisely the way that theory
would suggest.
In advancing this argument, I do not purport to draw any firm conclusions
about the optimality of any particular form of tiered access or use restrictions. A
determination of the most efficient institutional form would require detailed
analysis of the relevant cost data and network flows and would likely vary from
network to network. Indeed, one might well expect different networks to pursue
different pricing strategies. In addition, the data would need to be updated
constantly in response to technological changes. The difficulties in determining
the relative merits of various forms of access tiering and end user restrictions
provide one of the most powerful arguments against mandating or foreclosing
any particular institutional arrangement. The plausibility of economic benefits
provides sufficient justification for permitting network owners to experiment
with different pricing arrangements until actual harm to competition can be
demonstrated.
1. Prohibitions on Reselling Bandwidth or Acting as an Internet Service
Provider
Consider first restrictions on reselling bandwidth, acting as an ISP, or attach-
ing equipment that makes network service available to users residing outside the
subscriber’s premises.129 When analyzed under the framework laid out above,
such restrictions make perfect sense. A last-mile provider who finds that transac-
tion costs render deploying usage-based pricing uneconomical may find it
beneficial to turn to a flat-rate price set equal to average congestion costs
imposed by an average user. Even though such usage would be unmetered at the
margin, the flat-rate price could be calibrated to lead an equilibrium that
approaches efficient pricing.130 Reselling bandwidth or acting as an ISP would
upset this balance by having a single connection serve multiple end users
despite the fact that the cost of service was calibrated to reflect the network
demands imposed by a single user. This would in turn create economic ineffi-
ciency by allowing those end users to impose congestion costs that far exceed
the amount that they pay for the service. Prohibiting end users from reselling
bandwidth or acting as an ISP would thus appear to represent a necessary
concomitant way to facilitate flat-rate pricing.
129. See Wu, supra note 4, at 158 tbl. 1, 160, 162.
130. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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2. Restrictions on Home Networking
Another practice that has drawn the ire of network neutrality proponents are
restrictions on home networking, either prohibiting home networking or charg-
ing those who connect more than one computer to the network more for their
service.131 Restrictions on home networking may make sense for reasons simi-
lar to those justifying restrictions on the resale of bandwidth. Home networking
technologies permit multiple computers to access the Internet through a single
connection. This would be unproblematic under usage-sensitive pricing, since
each subscriber would be forced to compensate the network owner and other
users for the additional contribution to network congestion.
The situation is quite different if transaction costs make it more economical
for network owners to rely on flat-rate pricing. In that case, the network owner
sets the flat-rate price so that it equals the congestion costs imposed by the
average subscriber. Calibrating this price becomes significantly more difficult if
the number of computers attached to any link varies, because bandwidth usage
will vary from customer to customer depending on the number of computers
attached. Furthermore, the absence of any restrictions on the number of comput-
ers attached to a single connection can give rise to an adverse selection
problem, as high-volume end users take advantage of information asymmetries
to consume greater network resources without paying any additional compensa-
tion.132
The result will be to increase the flat rate charged, which simultaneously
excludes some users from access and forces low-volume users to cross subsi-
dize those who place more intensive demands on the Internet. It should thus
come as no surprise that network owners have experimented with prohibiting
home networking or charging those attaching multiple computers more for their
service. Such an approach is perfectly sensible when viewed through the lens of
congestion economics.
3. Restrictions on Attaching Devices
Another area of controversy centers on restrictions on end users’ right to
attach devices, such as gaming consoles, Internet phones, and WiFi routers. On
some occasions, network providers have prohibited the attachment of certain
equipment altogether.133 On other occasions, providers have required customers
wishing to attach such equipment to pay an additional charge.134 The economics
of congestion reveals why such measures may be quite sensible when transac-
tion costs render usage-sensitive pricing infeasible. To the extent that online
gaming consoles, Internet telephones, and home networking equipment are
associated with bandwidth-intensive applications, prohibiting them or requiring
131. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 157–58; Wu, supra note 4, at 161–62; Saltzer, supra note 4.
132. See Lee, supra note 21, at 338, 359.
133. See Wu, supra note 4, at 162.
134. See Schatz & Squeo, supra note 33.
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end users employing them to pay more for their use may represent a sensible
use of proxies for high-volume uses. The absence of such limits will increase
the cost of access, thereby reducing the number of people able to connect to the
Internet. It will also effectively allow high-volume users to free ride on the
contributions made by low-volume users.
The restrictions on attaching devices to the Internet are in some tension with
the FCC’s historical approach toward the attachment of handsets and other
customer premises equipment (CPE) to the public telephone network. With
respect to telephony, both the D.C. Circuit’s Hush-a-Phone and the FCC’s
Carterfone decisions recognized the customer’s right to interconnect any device
that would improve the utility of the telephone system “so long as the intercon-
nection does not adversely affect the telephone company’s operations or the
telephone system’s utility for others.”135 The FCC later promulgated rules
(commonly known as the “Part 68” rules after their location in the Code of
Federal Regulations) that allow the interconnection of any device that complies
with certain designated standards.136 As part of the second Computer Inquiry,
the FCC also prohibited common carriers from bundling CPE with telecommuni-
cations services.137
The context surrounding these decisions was quite different than that surround-
ing the Internet. For example, telephone service in the 1950s and 1960s was
provided over lines dedicated to individual residences and businesses. Placing a
local telephone call thus did not place much pressure on transmission facilities
shared with other users, and thus the impact that one person’s usage had on the
quality of service provided to other users was minimal.138 Long distance calling
did place additional pressure on shared transmission facilities, but those effects
were internalized through usage-sensitive prices.
In addition, at the time these rules were promulgated, there were no viable
alternatives to the local telephone network. Since there was little point in
promoting innovation and competition in transmission technologies, promoting
innovation and competition in complementary services represented a sensible
policy goal at that time.
The FCC and the Supreme Court have both acknowledged that the underly-
ing technological environment has changed in ways that have undercut the basis
135. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968);
see also Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (recognizing every
subscriber’s right “to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly
detrimental”).
136. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 68.1–.614 (2004).
137. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, Final Decision,
77 F.C.C.2d 384, 442–45 ¶¶ 149–155 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final Decision], aff’d sub nom.
Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
138. Local telephone calls do require the use of a local switch, which is a shared resource. The
scalability of switching capacity makes the collective impact of call usage easier to manage than
transmission capacity.
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for its previous policies.139 As an initial matter, the Internet is subject to
congestion in a way that was not true with respect to conventional telephone
service. The impact of congestion on other users is further exacerbated by the
fact that the devices end users attach to the network have an increasingly
heterogeneous impact on demand. As a result, the attachment of devices used to
run bandwidth-intensive applications to the network can adversely affect the
quality of service enjoyed by other end users, and these devices arguably
represent situations in which restrictions on attaching devices would be permis-
sible under both Carterfone and Hush-a-Phone. Lastly, as I will subsequently
discuss in greater detail, the emergence of alternative transmission technologies
is in the process of eliminating network owners’ ability to use end user
restrictions in an anticompetitive manner.140
4. Restrictions on Operating File Servers
Similar reasoning justifies restrictions on end users’ ability to operate servers
holding files for retrieval by other users. Prominent examples include webpage
hosting, game servers, and file sharing.141 These practices represent quintessen-
tial bandwidth-intensive uses of network services and are particularly problem-
atic once one acknowledges that network owners will inevitably take the usual
network usage patterns of typical users into account when designing their
networks. Because most end users download a larger volume of traffic than they
upload, network owners typically allocate bandwidth asymmetrically by devot-
ing more bandwidth to downloading.142 As a result, allowing end users to
operate servers places particular pressure on a system designed for different
usage patterns, which will degrade the quality of service for other users.
5. Discrimination Against Particular Applications
Another type of restriction that has drawn criticism from network neutrality
proponents are restrictions on particular applications. Some of these restrictions
are imposed against end users. For example, some acceptable use policies
prohibit commercial uses outright.143 Others simply require end users who wish
to use their connections for commercial purposes to subscribe to a higher-priced
service.144 Still others have responded to reports that file-sharing programs are
consuming an overwhelming share of the Internet’s capacity145 by requiring
139. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2708,
2710–11 (2005); Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 30, at 4825 ¶ 44; Wireline
Broadband NPRM, supra note 29, at 3040–42 ¶¶ 43–48.
140. See infra Part IV.C.3.c.
141. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 156; Bar et al., supra note 4, at 510; Wu, supra note 4, at 153–54,
159–60; Saltzer, supra note 4.
142. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 159; Wu, supra note 4, at 162–63.
143. See Wu, supra note 4, at 160–61.
144. See id. at 152; Bar et al., supra note 4, at 510.
145. See Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World: Hearings Before the
Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of Sam Yagan, President of Meta Machine,
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those who wish to file share to pay a higher charge or by barring the use of
file-sharing programs altogether.146 On other occasions, network owners discrimi-
nate against particular applications on the server side, rather than the end user
side, of the network. Specifically, some networks are considering deploying
devices known as “policy-based routers” that will give a higher priority to
traffic based on the application with which it is associated.
The defensibility of end user restrictions on certain applications again turns
on whether the applications being restricted are correlated with more intensive
consumption of network resources. If so, it is reasonable to ask those who make
greater use of network resources and who impose greater congestion costs on
other users either to forego such behavior or to internalize the costs they impose
on others.
The problems of network management can also justify the use of policy-
based routers on the server side as well. As I have discussed elsewhere, one
natural response to capacity constraints is to give traffic associated with time-
sensitive applications, such as streaming media or VoIP, a higher priority than
traffic associated with less time-sensitive applications, such as e-mail and web
browsing, in which delays of a third of a second are essentially unnoticeable.147
Discriminating among applications may thus represent nothing more than the
natural response of network owners attempting to manage congestion and
latency in a world in which capacity is constrained and in which end user
demands are increasingly heterogeneous and intense.
6. Discrimination Against Particular Content
The development that concerns network neutrality proponents the most is the
possibility that network owners will discriminate against particular content. The
original concern was that network owners would completely block access to
dispreferred websites,148 although FCC commissioners have repeatedly noted
Inc., the company that developed and distributes the market leading file-sharing program known as
eDonkey) (reporting a study indicating that in North America and the United Kingdom file sharing
represents 76% of total upstream and 48% of total downstream traffic, while in Europe it represents
85% of total upstream and 60% of all downstream traffic), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id1624&wit_id4689; Adams Picks Sandvine, XDSL NEWS, Aug. 1, 2005, at 13
(reporting that file sharing consumes 60% of Internet traffic); Executive Q&A: Can BitTorrent (Yes,
BitTorrent) Supercharge Mobile?, WIRELESS BUS. FORECAST, Aug. 25, 2005, at 1 (reporting that as much
as 50% of Internet traffic is file-sharing); Kathy Tracy, New Technologies Rock the L.A. Screenings,
VIDEO AGE INT’L, May 1, 2005, at 1 (reporting that 50% of all Internet traffic is file sharing); Ryan
Underwood, VU Moves to Unload Download Burden: 3 Barred Programs Hog Internet Capacity,
NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 1, 2005, at 1A (estimating that file sharing consumes 37% of the available
bandwidth capacity); Stephen Lawson, London is Global Internet Bandwidth Capital, INFOWORLD
DAILY, Sept. 8, 2005 (estimating that file sharing makes up 60% of Internet traffic), available at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/09/08/HNlondonbandwidth_1.html.
146. See Underwood, supra note 145, at 1A.
147. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 21–23.
148. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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the lack of evidence that network owners have widely adopted such practices149
and even network neutrality proponents acknowledge that port blocking does
not represent a serious problem.150 More recently, the focus has shifted away
from the outright blocking of access and toward the danger that network owners
will give traffic bound for or received from preferred content and applications
providers a higher priority or will inject latency into traffic associated with
dispreferred content and applications providers.151 Although the FCC has yet to
uncover any allegations that any network provider has pursued such prac-
tices,152 network neutrality proponents remain concerned that such discrimina-
tion might harm the competitiveness and innovativeness of markets for content
and applications.153 Similarly, network neutrality proponents have expressed
misgivings about what Professor Lessig has called “access tiering,” in which
content and applications pay different access charges depending on the levels of
service they would like to receive. The concern is that allowing large content
and applications to obtain guaranteed levels of bandwidth will restrict the
opportunities of other innovators who wish to offer Internet-based services.154
These arguments overlook the fact that the type of discrimination they decry
represents one of the most innovative ways found to date to mitigate the
problems of congestion and latency on the Internet. The following example
provides an apt illustration of my point: Suppose that an end user located in Los
Angeles attempts to download a webpage from a leading content provider, such
as CNN.com. If CNN hosted the content itself, all such queries would be
transmitted to CNN’s server (presumably located in CNN’s headquarters in
Atlanta). The distance that the packets comprising both the query and the
response would have to travel guarantees that this transaction would suffer from
at least some degree of latency. In addition, the network access points where
backbones exchange traffic may well be congested,155 as might CNN’s file
server.
A new technological solution known as “content delivery networks” has
emerged that has the potential to mitigate these problems.156 Content delivery
149. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Lessig Testimony, supra note 43, at 5 (calling port blocking problems “isolated”);
Anne Broache & Declan McCullagh, Playing Favorites on the Net?, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 21, 2005,
available at http://news.com.com/PlayingfavoritesontheNet/2100-1028_3-6003281.html (not-
ing that network neutrality proponent Amazon.com acknowledged that outright blocking of sites was
not a current problem and was unlikely to become one in the future).
151. See Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 11, at 18507–08 ¶ 140; SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 11,
at 18366 ¶ 141; LESSIG, supra note 4, at 160.
152. See Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 11, at 18508–09 ¶ 141; SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 11,
at 18367 ¶ 142.
153. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 160.
154. See Lessig Testimony, supra note 43, at 2, 8–10.
155. See Kende, supra note 64, at 6.
156. For an excellent overview of content delivery networks, see Dave Clark et al., The Growth of
Internet Overlay Networks: Implications for Architecture, Industry Structure and Policy 15–28 (Sept. 8,
2005) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 33rd Research Conference on Communication,
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networks dynamically store content and applications at multiple locations
throughout the Internet. When a last-mile network receives a query for content
stored on a content delivery network, instead of blindly directing that request to
the designated URL, the content delivery network may redirect the request to a
particular cache that is more closely located or less congested. In the process, it
can minimize delay and congestion costs by taking into account the topological
proximity of each server, the load on each server, and the relative congestion of
different portions of the network. In this manner, content delivery networks can
dynamically manage network traffic in a way that can minimize transmission
costs, congestion costs, and latency. Distributing multiple copies of the content
throughout the Internet also enhances network performance in other ways, by
allowing content and applications providers to aggregate server capacity and by
giving them added protection against denial of service attacks.157 Using distrib-
uted caching to bypass the backbones also weakens whatever market power is
enjoyed by backbones and regional ISPs.158 Content delivery networks have
proven tremendously successful. The leading content delivery network, known
as Akamai, reportedly maintains more than fourteen thousand servers and
handles more than fifteen percent of the world’s web content.159 Indeed, it is
conceivable that content delivery networks might displace the current architec-
ture and become the network, in much the same way that the Internet began as
an overlay on top of a voice network and is now in the process of displacing the
voice network.160
Content delivery networks thus appear to be an important alternative solution
to reducing network costs, managing congestion, and minimizing latency. The
problem is that content delivery networks violate network neutrality. Not only
does URL redirection violate the end-to-end argument by introducing intelli-
gence into the core of the network;161 the fact that content delivery networks are
commercial entities means that their benefits are available only to those entities
willing to pay for their services. In other words, MSNBC.com would suffer
greater latency and congestion than CNN.com unless it is also willing to pay a
content delivery network to assist in delivering its content.162
Information and Internet Policy), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/466/
TPRC_Overlays_9_8_05.pdf.
157. See id. at 23.
158. See Besen et al., supra note 68, at 292.
159. See Wilson P. Dizard III, Sliming from 170 to One: DHS Wants to Consolidate Portals and Web
Sites, Now It’s Looking for the Right Tools, WASH. TECH., June 6, 2005.
160. See Clark et al., supra note 156, at 5, 9–10, 43.
161. See id. at 18. For my critique of the way the end-to-end argument has been applied to the
network neutrality debate, see Yoo, supra note 64, at 41–46.
162. Network neutrality proponents also oppose access tiering because end users will not be able to
determine whether problems with latency are the responsibility of the network owner or the content and
applications provider. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 160. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has upheld a
district court decision condoning the bundling of complementary services (in this case installation and
service of a cable television system) with a monopoly product (in this case cable television equipment)
in part on the grounds that, should problems with the system develop, consumers would be unable to
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To the extent that it would prohibit networks from charging content and
applications providers for higher levels of service, network neutrality would
thus threaten to foreclose one of the most innovative solutions to the problems
of congestion and delay. Indeed, preventing network owners from pricing
bandwidth would foreclose them from employing the most widely used mecha-
nism for allocating scarce resources in our society. In the process, prohibiting
access tiering would have the unintended effect of favoring current industry
players whose offerings are not particularly bandwidth-intensive or time-
sensitive, while impeding the development of new applications whose creators
would gladly pay for higher guaranteed throughput rates if given the chance.163
7. The Insufficiency of Capacity Expansion and Tiered Pricing as Alternatives
Despite acknowledging that deviations from network neutrality may be justi-
fied by the needs of network management,164 network neutrality proponents still
argue against such restrictions. These arguments bear close scrutiny because it
is the persuasiveness of these justifications for overriding the needs of network
management that will determine the overall convincingness of network neutral-
ity proposals.
For example, Lessig acknowledges that the need to preserve quality of
service may justify some discrimination among applications,165 but suggests
that this problem can be solved simply by increasing capacity. Although Lessig
recognizes that the prospect of unlimited bandwidth is a classic example of the
impossible economic free lunch, he nonetheless states, “I’m willing to believe
in the potential of essentially infinite bandwidth. And I am happy to imagine the
scarcity-centric economist proven wrong.”166
Relying on capacity expansion to solve the problems related to congestion
implicitly presumes that capacity will grow faster than network demand.167
Over the longer term, there is no compelling reason to believe a priori that that
will be the case,168 especially given the number of would-be providers of
bandwidth-intensive applications that are waiting in the wings and in light of
the fact that the number of potential connections increases quadratically as the
determine whether the problems resulted from the equipment or the manner in which the equipment had
been installed and maintained. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable to allow the provider
bundle them together during the initial growth phase of its business. See United States v. Jerrold Elecs.
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557–58, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
163. In the words of one industry consultant, “‘If I have an expanding business or I create a
[high-bandwidth] application, I’d gladly pay for better service.’” See Ben Worthen, The Net Neutrality
Debate: You Pay, You Play?, CIO MAG., Apr. 15, 2006, available at http://www.cio.com/archive/041506/
net.html?page3.
164. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
165. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 46, 174.
166. Id. at 47.
167. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 22, 70–71.
168. See MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra note 24, at 260.
2006] 1883NETWORK NEUTRALITY
number of end users connected to the system increases.169 Indeed, many
observers take for granted the existence of a cadre of would-be providers of
bandwidth-intensive applications waiting in the wings to soak up any increases
in capacity.
Relying on capacity expansion to solve problems related to congestion also
ignores the problems associated with the inherent impossibility of perfect
forecasting of demand and the inability to expand capacity instantaneously.
Unless network owners are able to anticipate changes in demographic patterns,
improvements in networking technology, and the development of complemen-
tary products that drive demand for network services, situations will exist in
which network owners underestimate the growth in network demand. When that
occurs, some form of network management may prove to be the only viable
short-run solution. Stated more generally, capacity expansion and network
management represent alternative approaches to dealing with the problems of
congestion. Because the relative costs of each solution are likely to be different
and likely to vary over time, there appears to be no reason to erect what would
amount to a systematic preference for one solution over the other.170
To cite one salient example, the widescale deployment of personal computers
(PCs) during the mid-1980s allowed end users to connect to the precursor to the
Internet maintained by the National Science Foundation (known as NSFNET)
through PCs rather than dumb terminals. The increased functionality provided
by the PC enabled users to run increasingly bandwidth-intensive applications on
the network, most notably file transfer programs. As a result, terminal-based
NSFNET sessions began to run unacceptably slowly. Because capacity cannot
be added instantaneously, NSFNET adopted the interim solution of reprogram-
ming its routers to give terminal sessions priority over file transfer sessions.171
This emergence of the PC represents an exogenous shock caused by a technologi-
cal development in a related technology that is inevitable in the broadband
industry and which makes anticipating the future demand for capacity difficult.
This example also shows how discrimination on the basis of the application can
be the preferred (and perhaps the only feasible) solution to problems of manag-
ing a network in an environment characterized by rapid changes in technology
and consumer demand. Given that the costs of discrimination and capacity
expansion are likely to vary from case to case, and amidst the uncertainty that
the cost of adding capacity will decline faster than demand for network capacity
will grow, it would seem imprudent to precommit to one solution over the other.
Other commentators urge network owners to solve congestion problems
through tiered pricing.172 Although tiered pricing would solve some of the
problems associated with congestion costs, it would also require the establish-
169. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 73, at 1696 (noting that for n users, the number of total possible
connections is (1/2)n(n – 1)).
170. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 21–23, 71.
171. See id. at 22–23; Mackie-Mason & Varian, supra note 24, at 259.
172. See Wu, supra note 4, at 154.
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ment of mechanisms for monitoring bandwidth usage and for bringing enforce-
ment actions against those who exceed the bandwidth limits. As a result, it
would require the incurrence of transaction costs quite similar to those required
to implement a regime of usage-sensitive pricing. To the extent that the transac-
tions costs are likely to render usage-sensitive pricing uneconomical, they will
probably also preclude the use of tiered pricing as a solution.
B. A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON CONSUMER WELFARE
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, contrary to the suggestions of
network neutrality proponents, allowing some end user restrictions may in fact
be welfare enhancing. In so doing, it underscores the often overlooked down-
side to the image of competition advanced by network neutrality proponents, in
which end users and providers of content and applications are able to contract
with each other freely in a constantly shifting spot market. Use of the alternative
institutional forms can in fact benefit consumers by effectively lowering the
prices paid by low-volume end users. In addition, increasing the economic
efficiency of the overall pricing system should lower the price of basic access,
which in turn should increase the number of people able to benefit from the
network’s services.173
In this sense, the debate over network neutrality bears a number of striking
parallels to the debate over vertical integration under the antitrust laws.174 Until
the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court clearly embraced a vision of competition
quite similar to that espoused by network neutrality proponents. Fueled by a
scholarly literature that was largely distrustful of vertically integrated enter-
prises,175 the Supreme Court invalidated a wide range of exclusivity arrange-
ments on the grounds that they infringed on consumers’ freedom of choice.176
The Court invalidated other exclusivity arrangements as an impermissible
restriction on manufacturers’ ability to access all channels of distribution.177
173. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
174. See generally Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of
the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 466–77 (2000) (providing an overview of the shift in
antitrust policy).
175. See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 381 (2d ed. 1968); ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 350–51 (1932); ARTHUR ROBERT
BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION: A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 462–521
(1936); EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 122–23 (3d ed. 1938). See
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68
TEX. L. REV. 105, 153–66 (1989) (surveying the intellectual history of the hostility towards vertical
integration).
176. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (holding that exclusive dealing
contracts “conflict[ ] with the central policy of [the antitrust laws] against contracts which take away
freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market”); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (concluding that tying arrangements represent an improper interference with
“buyers’ independent judgment” about the merits of the product).
177. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610–11 (1972) (invaliding exclusive
sales territories as an unlawful restriction on an individual seller’s right not to be foreclosed from any
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Over time, however, the Court began to realize that this atomistic vision of
competition often exacted a steep price.178 Economic theorists began to identify
circumstances under which vertical integration and vertical contractual re-
straints could promote efficiency, either by eliminating downstream monopoly
pricing179 or by rationalizing the proportions of variable inputs.180 Even more
important was the realization that vertical integration could also yield transac-
tion cost efficiencies that could not be realized in the world of unfettered buyer
and trader freedom.181 In particular, economists began to recognize how vertical
integration and vertical contractual restraints that simulate vertical integration
(such as exclusive dealing contracts, tying, and territorial exclusivity) can
reduce the transaction costs needed to protect against opportunism.182
The Supreme Court eventually embraced this emerging vision in its landmark
decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, in which it accepted the
reduction of the transaction costs needed to guard against opportunism as a
pro-competitive business justification sufficient to support holding exclusivity
agreements.183 In the process, the Court rejected buyer and trader freedom as
independent values that justify regulatory intervention even in the absence of
any showing of harm to competition.184 In so doing, the Court implicitly
reaffirmed the principle that the antitrust laws were enacted for “the protection
of competition, not competitors.”185 If competition is sufficiently robust, the
one sector of the economy); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152–53 (1968) (holding that price
fixing agreements “‘cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance
with their judgment’” (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,
213 (1951))), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1959) (concluding that group boycotts “cripple the freedom of
traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment” and “takes from
Klor’s its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market,” and “deprives . . . manufacturers
and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor’s”).
178. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 189–90, 192–200, 260–64 (2002) (reviewing the potential efficien-
cies from vertical integration).
179. See, e.g., Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and
Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960); Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950).
180. See, e.g., Lionel W. McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms, 61 ECON. J. 785
(1951); John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration,
79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971).
181. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
182. See Yoo, supra note 178, at 192–200, 260–64. For some of the leading authorities in this
literature, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
20–40, 82–131 (1975); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); and Lester G. Telser, Why Should
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
183. 433 U.S. 36, 54–55 (1977).
184. Id. at 53 n.21 (rejecting the proposition that “the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit
restriction on the autonomy of independent businessmen” even in the absence of harm to competition).
185. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (offering the classic statement of
this proposition). For more recent statements, see NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135
(1998); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993); Atlantic
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reduction in freedom of some consumers or manufacturers does not rise to the
level of antitrust concern, as any consumer who wishes to avoid the strictures of
the exclusivity arrangement can do so simply by shifting their purchases to
another provider.186
Sylvania marked a sea change in competition policy with respect to vertical
integration. Following Sylvania, the debate shifted away from the impact on
individual buyers and traders and instead focused on increasingly sophisticated
analyses of whether or not particular exclusivity arrangements promote eco-
nomic welfare.187 Thereafter, antitrust law has become increasingly hospitable
to vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints.188
The image of end user and application/content provider freedom that lies at
the center of network neutrality is quite reminiscent of the vision of an atomized
market composed of small manufacturers that dominated pre-Sylvania antitrust
law. Indeed, network neutrality proponents often wax rhapsodic about the early
days of the Internet when small innovators were important sources of new
Internet content and applications.189 That the Court has since rejected this vision
and has acknowledged that vertical integration and exclusivity arrangements
can often promote competition is quite striking and suggests a dramatically
different model of industrial organization. This history of vertical integration
thus cautions against taking too narrow a vision of competition and taking too
skeptical a position with respect to exclusivity.
C. THE IMPACT OF EXCLUSIVITY ON INNOVATION
Network neutrality proponents do not simply justify their arguments on the
need to preserve the autonomy of end users and providers of applications,
content, and devices for its own sake. They also argue that network neutrality is
essential to promoting and preserving innovation on the Internet. The concern is
that without guaranteed access to markets, content and applications providers
will be deterred from innovating and that network owners will make decisions
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986); and Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977).
186. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11–12 (1984); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1958).
187. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago
School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84
MICH. L. REV. 213, 255–83 (1985); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of
Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 240–50 (1995).
188. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506
U.S. 447, 459 (1993); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Barry Wright Corp.
v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236–37 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.). See generally Yoo, supra note
178, at 187–205 (tracing this shift in the vertical integration doctrine).
189. See, e.g., Lessig Testimony, supra note 43, at 4.
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that hurt the interests of the public as a whole.190
Both the FCC and network neutrality proponents recognize that it is typically
in the best interests of network owners to maximize the value that end users
derive from their network connections.191 Indeed, competition policy has long
rejected the notion that the owners of bottleneck facilities have systematic
incentives to expand into vertically related markets for the simple reason that
there is only one monopoly rent generated by any vertical chain of production
and a monopolist can extract the entirety of that rent without vertically integrat-
ing simply by charging the monopoly price for the bottleneck facility.192
Although later theorists identified limited circumstances under which the one
monopoly rent theorem does not hold, those models explicitly or implicitly
assume that the relevant markets are both concentrated and protected by barriers
to entry.193 For reasons described more completely below,194 those structural
preconditions are not satisfied in the context of broadband, which makes it far
more likely that vertical integration is motivated by a desire to achieve efficien-
cies than it is by a desire to harm competition in the adjacent market.
One would thus expect a network owner’s natural instinct would be to open
up its network to all content and applications providers, because doing so would
maximize the value of its network and thus maximize the amount that it could
charge for network access. Because innovation in applications and content only
serves to increase a network’s value, network owners should have every incen-
tive to encourage such innovation. To the extent that innovation is best pro-
moted by an open architecture, network owners can generally be expected to
embrace it in the absence of some element that leads to market failure.195 The
failure of early proprietary services provided by America Online, CompuServe,
and Prodigy196 attests to the market’s ability to discipline network owners who
attempt to impose closed architectures on consumers who prefer open ones.
This underscores the extent to which the interests of network owners on the
one hand and the interests of content and application providers on the other
hand are aligned. Both have a strong interest in maximizing total sales, since
190. See Wu and Lessig Ex parte, supra note 7, at 3–9; LESSIG, supra note 4, at 156, 168, 175; Mark
A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in
the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 932, 945–46 (2001); Wu, supra note 4, at 145, 155.
191. See Wireline Broadband Access Order, supra note 48, at 14892–94 ¶¶ 74–76; LESSIG, supra
note 4, at 161; Wu, supra note 4, at 142; Wu and Lessig, Ex parte, supra note 7, at 7.
192. See Yoo, supra note 178, at 188–89. For the seminal statement of this proposition, see Ward S.
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20–21 (1957).
193. See Yoo, supra note 178, at 202–05, 265–67.
194. See infra Part IV.C.2–3.
195. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
85, 104 (2003) (noting that “the platform monopolist has an incentive to be a good steward of the
applications sector for its platform”); Speta, supra note 1, at 76 (noting that network owners have the
incentive to maximize the value of complementary services); cf. Benjamin, supra note 1, at 2086–89
(making a similar point in the context of spectrum-based networks).
196. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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doing so will maximize their joint profits. Indeed, this is the same conclusion
that the FCC’s Network Inquiry Special Staff drew more than twenty years ago
with respect to the relationship between the broadcast television networks (the
analog to modern applications and content providers) and their local affiliates
(the analog modern last-mile providers). Simply put, both players have a strong
interest in maximizing joint profits. They will inevitably vie with one another
over how those profits should be divided.197 Although the division of profits
will be of intense interest to the parties, it raises few, if any, policy implications.
From this perspective, absent market failure, mandating network neutrality is
unnecessary at best and counterproductive at worst. If innovation is better
promoted by open architectures, network owners can be expected to embrace
network neutrality voluntarily, in which case regulatory intervention would be
unnecessary. If innovation is better promoted by closed architectures, mandating
network neutrality would only serve to frustrate the very goals that network
neutrality would purport to promote. It is for this reason that network neutrality
arguments necessarily depend on the presence of some externality that creates
market failure by driving a wedge between the private benefits network owners
capture and the benefits that accrue to society as a whole.198 To supply this
critical element, network neutrality proponents turn to the branch of economics
concerning network economic effects.199
1. The Inapplicability of Network Economic Effects
Network economic effects arise when the value of the network is determined
by the number of other users connected to the same network.200 The value of a
network to an innovator depends on the number of customers it can reach
through the network. The larger the number, the more valuable the network.201
The problem is that end users who join a network are typically unable to capture
the benefits created by their adoption decision. Some scholars regard the
presence of these unappropriable benefits as a positive network externality that
will cause overall utilization of the network to drop below efficient levels.202
The result is a collective action problem that leads individuals to make deci-
sions that deviate from the outcomes that would prevail if coordination were
197. See STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION 55–57, 65 (1984).
198. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 162, 168, 175.
199. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998) (surveying the literature on network economic effects).
200. A classic example is the choice between VHS and Beta formats for video cassette recorders
(VCRs). Network economics would suggest that in choosing which type of VCR to buy, a consumer
cared less about the technical capabilities of each format and more about which format was adopted by
other consumers. See W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92 (1990).
For a cogent argument against regarding VHS’s victory over Beta as the result of network economic
effects, see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern for
Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 314–16 (1996).
201. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 171.
202. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibil-
ity, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
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possible. Similarly, when different providers own and operate portions of the
network, the decisions of owners of particular portions of the network can
create costs and benefits that they do not fully internalize. Individual providers
may find it individually profitable to engage in behavior that harms the network
as a whole. These theorists also suggest that the presence of network externali-
ties can turn exclusivity into a competitive weapon. By providing exclusive
access to certain content, the owners of the largest networks can leave end users
who wish to access that content no choice but to join their network. Network
neutrality proponents also contend that network economic effects can adversely
affect innovation. Exclusivity arrangements can prevent content and applica-
tions providers from reaching the critical mass of potential customers needed to
support their products. The inability to reach these customers lowers the incen-
tive to invest in innovative content and applications.203
The problem with these arguments is that they ignore the fact that network
externality theory is subject to a number of caveats and limiting conditions.204
For example, network neutrality advocates overlook the fact that network
economics gives rise to two effects that push in opposite directions.205 On the
one hand, a decision by a network to leave an existing standard in favor of a
new standard provides value to those who have already adopted the new
standard. The inability to capture this benefit can create a positive externality
which will make network owners too reluctant to switch standards, which leads
to a situation sometimes called excess friction. At the same time, a decision to
switch to a new standard necessarily reduces the value of the network running
on the existing standard. The fact that network owners who switch standards do
not bear these costs gives rise to a negative externality that makes them too
eager to switch standards and can lead to a situation known as excess momen-
tum.
Whether networks switch standards too frequently or not frequently enough
from the standpoint of social welfare depends upon which of these two effects
dominates. This creates an empirical question that cannot be answered a priori
and does not necessarily favor complete interoperability on open standards.
Indeed, a formal model developed by Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro suggests
competition between proprietary standards is more likely to lead to the adoption
of the socially optimal technology than is competition in which one or both of
the competing standards are nonproprietary.206 The ambiguity of this balance is
demonstrated dramatically by comparing the positions taken by network neutral-
203. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 171; Wu, supra note 4, at 151.
204. The discussion that follows is based on Yoo, supra note 178, at 278–85, and Spulber & Yoo,
supra note 28, at 925–30.
205. See Yoo, supra note 178, at 278–79 (citing Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 941–42
(1986)).
206. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externali-
ties, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986).
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ity proponents with the concern traditionally associated with network econom-
ics. The traditional concern is that network economic effects will cause a
network to become locked into an obsolete standard.207 Network neutrality is
concerned that network owners will be too eager to deviate from the current
regime of universal interoperability.208
Furthermore, the arguments advanced by network neutrality proponents over-
look the fundamental difference between networks in which end users are
physically interconnected (called direct network externalities) and networks in
which the relationship between end users are mediated by a market (called
indirect network externalities).209 Direct network externalities do not represent
an economic problem. Because they arise within a physical network that can be
owned, the network owner is in an ideal position to solve the collective action
problem by capturing the benefits created by increases in network size. Thus,
even if end users are unable to appropriate all of the benefits associated with
their adoption decisions, the network owner is in a position to internalize these
benefits by charging prices that reflect the benefits new users confer on incum-
bents. Indeed, the owner of a physically interconnected network has every
incentive to maximize the value of the network in this manner.210 The fact that
the benefits resulting from any increase in the network’s value would accrue
directly to the network owner effectively aligns social benefits with private
benefits.211
Finally, concerns about network economic effects are ameliorated further by
the fact that the broadband industry is undergoing rapid growth. Both cable
modem and DSL providers have continued to add subscribers at a brisk pace.212
A host of new technologies, including third-generation mobile communications
207. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); Farrell & Saloner, supra note 205, at 942–43; Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93,
108; cf. Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041,
1045–54 (1996) (arguing that Internet standards are subject to lock-in).
208. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 48, 168, 171, 176.
209. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 202, at 424; Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70–71 (1985).
210. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market
Failure?, 17 RES. LAW & ECON. 1, 11–13 (1995); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network
Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 137 (1994).
211. Network neutrality proponents more plausibly argue that negotiating exclusivity arrangements
can result in transaction and coordination costs. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 162, 171. At the same time,
the FCC has recognized that imposing nondiscrimination requirements creates transaction costs of their
own. See Wireline Broadband Access Order, supra note 48, 14887–92 ¶¶ 65–73, 14904–05 ¶ 97. The
fact that transaction cost considerations push in both directions effectively undercuts any attempt to
derive simple policy inferences with respect to network neutrality. Moreover, the reduction in transac-
tion costs made possible by the Internet and the proliferation of institutional solutions, such as
centralized transaction clearinghouses, makes it likely that over time the balance will shift in favor of
permitting greater exclusivity.
212. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30,
2005, at 2–3, tbls.2–4 (Apr. 2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
264744A1.pdf.
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devices (3G), broadband over powerline (BPL), and wireless hotspots employ-
ing WiFi technology, are waiting in the wings.213 When that is the case,
application and content providers will be less concerned about current market
shares of broadband providers and more about the relative market positions they
will obtain in the future and should find it relatively easy to vie for new
customers. In short, it is the market of tomorrow, not the market of today, that
will determine the behavior of applications and content providers.214
2. The Lack of Concentration in a Properly Defined Market
Furthermore, a close examination of the leading models of network economic
effects reveals that anticompetitive outcomes necessarily depend on the exis-
tence of a dominant network owner with market power.215 It is a common
misperception that the broadband markets are sufficiently concentrated to justify
regulatory intervention.216 On the contrary, once the relevant markets that
network neutrality is designed to protect have been properly identified, it
becomes clear that the concentration levels fall short of those traditionally
associated with anticompetitive concern.217
The key to understanding this important insight is recognizing that applica-
tion and content providers care about the total number of users they can reach.
So long as their total potential customer base is sufficiently large, it does not
really matter whether they are able to reach users in any particular city. This
point is well illustrated by a series of recent decisions regarding the market for
cable television programming. As the FCC and the D.C. Circuit recognized, a
television programmer’s viability does not depend on its ability to reach viewers
in any particular localities, but rather on the total number of viewers it is able to
reach nationwide. So long as a cable network can reach a sufficient number of
viewers to ensure viability, the fact that a particular network owner may refuse
carriage in any particular locality is of no consequence.218 The FCC has
similarly rejected the notion that the local market power enjoyed by early
cellular telephone providers posed any threat to the cellular telephone equip-
213. Availability of Advanced Telecommunications Capability in the United States, FCC, Fourth
Report to Congress, 19 F.C.C.R. 20540, 20553–62 (2004) [hereinafter Fourth § 706 Report].
214. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J.
INDUS. ECON. 55, 67, 73 (1992); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 200, at 292.
215. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 28, at 923, 926; cf. Yoo, supra note 178, at 202–05, 265–67
(noting that the post-Chicago theories supporting the monopoly leverage theory of vertical integration
depend on the assumption that the markets are highly concentrated and protected by entry barriers).
216. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 159; Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential Demand for Broadband
Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE J. ON
REG. 129, 155 (2001); Lemley & Lessig, supra note 190, at 952; Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer,
Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 631, 649 (2001).
217. See Yoo, supra note 64, at 50–53; Yoo, supra note 178, at 253–58.
218. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19098, 19114–18 ¶¶ 40–50 (1999)).
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ment market, since any one cellular provider represented a tiny fraction of the
national equipment market.219 Simply put, it is national reach, not local reach,
that matters. This in turn implies that the relevant geographic market is a
national one, not a local one. What matters is not the percentage of broadband
subscribers that any particular provider controls in any geographic area, but
rather the percentage of a nationwide pool of subscribers that that provider
controls.
Once the relevant market is properly defined in this manner, it becomes clear
that the broadband market is too unconcentrated for vertical integration to pose
a threat to competition. The standard measure of market concentration is the
Hershman-Hirfindahl Index (HHI), which is calculated by summing the squares
the market shares of each individual firm.220 The guidelines employed by the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission establish 1800 as the
HHI threshold for determining when vertical integration would be a cause for
anticompetitive concern.221 The FCC has applied an HHI threshold of 2600 in
its recent review of mergers in the wireless industry.222 The concentration levels
for the broadband industry as of September 2005 yields an HHI of only 1110,
well below the thresholds identified above.223 The imminent arrival of 3G,
WiFi, WiMax, BPL, and other new broadband technologies promises to decon-
centrate this market still further in the near future.
The inability of competitors in a deconcentrated market to harm competition
is well illustrated by the following thought experiment: Suppose that Verizon
decided to enter into exclusivity arrangements with a number of applications
and content providers and to prohibit its subscribers from accessing competing
websites. Would that type of move be regarded as such a significant threat to
competition that regulators should prohibit Verizon from experimenting with
such a business model? The standard economic answer is “no.” At nine percent
of the market, Verizon lacks the market position to harm competition through
unilateral action. When that is the case, the standard economic response is to let
219. See Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service, FCC, Report and
Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 4028, 4029–30 ¶ 13 (1992).
220. See generally Yoo, supra note 64, at 52–53. For example, a four-firm market with market
shares of 40%, 30%, 20%, and 10% would yield an HHI of 402  302  202  102  1600  900 
400  100  3000.
221. See U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Non-Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines §§ 4.131, 4.213, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/2614.htm (applying an HHI threshold of 1800). See generally Yoo, supra note 64, at 52–53
(discussing HHI and the relevant guideline thresholds).
222. See Applications of Nextel Communications, Inc. and Sprint Corp. for Consent to Transfer
Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 13967, 13993
¶ 63 (2005) (applying an HHI threshold of 2800); Applications of Western Wireless Corp. and Alltel
Corp. for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 13053, 13073 ¶¶ 46–47 (2005) (same); Applications of AT&T Wireless Services,
Inc. and Cingular Wireless Corp. for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21522, 21568 ¶¶ 106–107 (2004) (same).
223. The HHI calculation is based on subscriber data reported in Broache & McCullagh, supra note
150. For earlier data, see Yoo, supra note 64, at 53 fig. 4, and Yoo, supra note 178, at 256 tbl. VII.
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the experiment go forward. As the previous discussion makes clear, it is quite
conceivable that the efficiency benefits from exclusivity will justify deviating
from interoperability, in which case permitting the experiment to go forward
will represent a social benefit. If not, the experiment will fail and Verizon will
be under substantial economic pressure to reopen its network. Although Verizon
subscribers may be somewhat chagrined while the experiment runs its course,
those harms represent more of a harm to a competitor than the type of harm to
competition needed to justify intervention under the traditional competition
policy.
3. The Emergence of Competition
One of the most important developments distinguishing the current technologi-
cal environment from the one prevailing at the time the rules prohibiting local
telephone companies from discriminating against so-called foreign attachments
were adopted is the emergence of alternative last-mile technologies.224 At the
time the aforementioned prohibitions were adopted, local telephone companies
faced little competition from other network providers.225 The absence of compet-
ing options strengthened the arguments for compelling access to what was then
the only available means of providing service.
As the Supreme Court and the FCC have recognized, the emergence of
alternative network providers has rendered this justification considerably less
compelling.226 The presence of competition drastically reduces the ability of
network owners to use exclusivity arrangements to harm competition because
disgruntled consumers can simply transfer their subscriptions to another net-
work. As I have discussed in some detail elsewhere, compelling access can also
dampen the incentives for those device manufacturers shut out by exclusivity
arrangements to help finance the buildout of alternative network capacity.
Rescuing these manufacturers from having to undertake these investments can
thus have the perverse effect of entrenching whatever market concentration that
exists by depriving would-be builders of alternative or competing networks of
their natural strategic partners.227 Empirical studies have indicated that the
access requirements imposed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 have
dampened investment incentives in precisely this manner.228 The conduct of the
leading content providers and device manufacturers in the immediate aftermath
of the Supreme Court’s Brand X decision is similarly telling. When faced with
224. See Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile
Services, 20 F.C.C.R. 15908 (2005) (increased penetration of mobile phones); Fourth § 706 Report,
supra note 213, at 20553–62.
225. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of alternatives to the local
telephone network during the time of the Computer Inquiries).
226. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
227. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 48–53; Yoo, supra note 178, at 246–47, 268–69.
228. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 51 & nn.198–199 (collecting sources).
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the impending loss of guaranteed access to cable modem and DSL systems,
Google, IBM, and Intel have each undertaken major investments in BPL,229
while other content providers, such as Disney, EarthLink, and ESPN, entered
into strategic partnerships with existing wireless broadband technologies.230
Most striking of all is Google’s plan to build a wireless Internet network for the
city of San Francisco for free.231 Google’s willingness to make such a large
investment eloquently demonstrates how the prospect of losing guaranteed
access to last-mile networks can provide powerful incentives to invest in
alternative transmission technologies.
Indeed, these insights underscore the extent to which network neutrality
proponents are focusing on the wrong policy problem.232 Economic theory has
demonstrated that every vertical chain of production will only be efficient if
every link is competitive. This suggests that the central goal of competition
policy should be to identify the link in the chain of production that is the most
concentrated and protected by entry barriers and to increase competition within
that link. In the case of the Internet, the markets for applications and content are
already the ones that are the most competitive and, given the low barriers to
entry, the most likely to remain that way. The central policy focus should be on
how to encourage greater entry by new last-mile providers. When competition
is emerging and entry by alternative network providers is feasible, there are
strong arguments that this goal can best be accomplished by permitting network
owners to enter into exclusivity arrangements.
The history of the regulatory precedents invoked by network neutrality
proponents largely confirms these insights, as the increase in competition has
led the FCC to steadily roll back its role in regulating CPE. For example, in
2000 the FCC relinquished its role in establishing the technical criteria for CPE
and turned those functions over to private standard-setting bodies.233 The FCC
subsequently abolished the prohibition on bundling CPE with telecommunica-
tions services.234 Given the overall logic and direction of these regulations, they
would appear to serve as only a weak precedent for regulating the Internet in the
future.
229. See Ed Gubbins, Intel Gets Behind BPL, TELEPHONY, Sept. 5, 2005 at 16; Ken Kerschbaumer,
Plug-and-Play Internet: Wall-Outlet Broadband Attracts Heavy Hitters, BROAD. & CABLE, July 18,
2005, at 20.
230. See Jesse Drucker & Merissa Marr, Disney to Enter Cellphone Market, with Kids in Mind,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 2005, at D5; Bob Keefe, Battered EarthLink Shifts Gears: Phone Services Play
Role in Makeover, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 24, 2005, at C1.
231. See Laurie J. Flynn, Some Worries as San Francisco Goes Wireless, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006,
at C5.
232. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 15–19; Yoo, supra note 64, at 59–60.
233. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review of Part 68 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations,
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 24944 (2000).
234. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order,
16 F.C.C.R. 7418 (2001).
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D. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTING NETWORK NEUTRALITY
Any regulatory regime that attempts to mandate nondiscrimination would
confront significant practical difficulties as well. Specifically, past efforts to
impose nondiscrimination requirements have all too often proven unworkable.
In addition, a literature has emerged warning of the dangers of prophylactic
regulation, which has underscored the risks of adhering to the status quo in the
face of uncertainty.
1. The Difficulty in Supervising Nondiscrimination Mandates
Like all access regimes, network neutrality would necessarily require the
imposition of four different types of regulatory requirements. First, network
neutrality requires mandating interconnection by requiring network owners to
provide content and application providers access to their facilities. Second,
interconnection must occur across a defined interface, which inevitably requires
standardization.235 Third, network neutrality would require mandating nondis-
crimination, in order to prevent network owners from defeating the interconnec-
tion requirement simply by favoring preferred providers. Fourth, a network
owner could attempt to evade network neutrality simply by charging both
affiliated and unaffiliated content and applications providers nondiscriminatory,
but exorbitant fees. Such fees would simply redistribute profit from the content
affiliate to the network affiliate, while simultaneously subjecting unaffiliated
content and applications providers to a price squeeze.236 At the same time, the
Supreme Court has recognized that mandating access becomes much less
tractable when the network services vary in terms of quality, the industry is
technologically dynamic, and the complexity of the interface allows for a
myriad of ways that network owners can provide discriminatory or substandard
interconnection.237 The implication is that regulators who wish to mandate
network neutrality will have to police quality of service and other nonprice
terms of service. In short, when the interface is complex, network neutrality
poses regulatory authorities with the nearly insuperable task of regulating
almost all aspects of the business relationship.238 Nondiscrimination mandates
235. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 3, 5–6.
236. See id. at 37–39.
237. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (recognizing that interconnection disputes are “highly technical” and multifaceted “given the
incessant, complex, and costly changing interaction of competitive and incumbent LECs implementing
the sharing and interconnection obligations”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 429 (1999)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The more complex the facilities, the more
central their relation to the firm’s managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded,
the more likely these [the administrative and social costs of compulsory sharing] will become
serious.”).
238. See Yoo, supra note 178, at 244–46, 268–69 (noting that variability in quality of cable
programming frustrates meaningful regulation and regulators mediating disputes over terms and
conditions of access); Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications
Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 73, 81 (2003).
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are likely to succeed only when the interface between products is relatively
simple, easy to monitor, and requires little information from the network.239 The
FCC’s experience in attempting to implement nondiscrimination regimes with
respect to long distance, cable television, and local telephone service attests to
these difficulties.240 I find it particularly telling that two distinguished scholars
of network industries not particularly noted for deregulatory views (including
one who was directly involved in imposing access requirements on the Baby
Bells in the aftermath of the breakup of AT&T) have suggested that access
regimes have proven so unworkable that they should be abandoned.241
The FCC’s history with nondiscrimination regimes thus provides ample
reason to be skeptical about the likely success of attempts to mandate broad-
band nondiscrimination. The complexity of the interface, the increasing hetero-
geneity of end users’ demands, and the pace of technological change severely
challenge policymakers’ ability to implement network neutrality with respect to
broadband.242
2. The Danger of Prophylactic Intervention in the Face of Uncertainty
Network neutrality proponents argue in the alternative that regulatory interven-
tion is needed because broadband network owners often fail to appreciate the
benefits to innovation provided by open network architectures.243 Lessig has
argued that the incumbents’ inability to perceive their long-term business
interests justifies mandating network neutrality.244 Wu, while reluctant to argue
that network owners are incapable of apprehending their true long-term inter-
ests,245 nonetheless contends that regulators should use the threat of regulation
to educate network owners about their true long-term interests.246
Even if true, this observation fails to serve as a justification for imposing
network neutrality. Network owners’ misperception of their long-term business
interests is generally not considered to be a valid justification for regulatory
intervention, since such an error typically involves a harm to a competitor rather
239. See id. at 77–86.
240. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 40–42.
241. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications,
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (1999).
242. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 39–45.
243. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 30–38, 176; Farrell & Weiser, supra note 195, at 115–16; Lemley &
Lessig, supra note 190, at 937–38; Wu, supra note 4, at 143, 145, 154–55.
244. In Lessig’s words:
Dinosaurs should die . . . . And innovators should resist efforts by dinosaurs to keep control.
Not because dinosaurs are evil; not because they can’t change; but because the greatest
innovation will come from those outside these old institutions. Whatever the scientists at Bell
Labs understood, AT&T didn’t get it. Some may offer a theory to explain why AT&T wouldn’t
get it. But this is a point most understand without needing to invoke a fancy theory.
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 176.
245. See Wu, supra note 4, at 143.
246. See id. at 154–55, 156.
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than a harm to competition.247 The irony is that although network neutrality
proponents invoke the rhetoric of a Darwinian, survival-of-the-fittest competi-
tion among applications and content,248 they fail to follow the reasoning to its
logical conclusion. Taking the evolutionary analogy seriously would imply that
companies that adopt flawed business plans should not be saved from those
mistakes by regulation or guided away from them by education. The collapse of
a broadband network should not reduce competition over the long term because
the physical network assets will continue to exist, awaiting redeployment by
another entity. It would create some short-run transition costs, but such costs are
inevitable in any market-based system and must be tolerated if society is to
enjoy the benefits that markets provide.
Furthermore, any proposed regulatory solution must take care to avoid the
classic nirvana fallacy: Just because a market-based outcome is suboptimal does
not mean that a government-imposed outcome will necessarily fare any better.
Indeed, a burgeoning literature exists analyzing how transaction costs, imperfect
information, and collective action problems can cause regulatory intervention to
fail to maximize social welfare.249 Determining the best course of action thus
requires an exercise in the comparative second best. In other words, arguments
in favor of regulatory correction of suboptimal business decisions are coherent
only if one presumes that regulatory authorities would be better at perceiving
and furthering what would be in network owners’ best interests than would the
network owners themselves.
Such an assertion is difficult to maintain once one recognizes the inherent
difficulties in determining which business strategies will ultimately prove success-
ful when confronted with sound economic reasons that can plausibly justify the
restrictions in question. The same foresight difficulties that have allegedly led
network owners astray are likely to plague regulators as well. If the experts in
the academy and in the industry are unable to make correct assessments of what
would best foster innovation, there is little reason to presume that the experts in
the government will do any better.
Finally, regulatory intervention is especially problematic when, as here, it is
meant to forestall a perceived danger that has not yet materialized. Commenta-
tors have cautioned about the dangers of regulating on the basis of predictive
harms250 and have argued that preserving the status quo becomes untenable as a
247. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 318 (1966); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 549–50 (1985).
248. See Wu & Lessig, Ex parte, supra note 7, at 5–6; Wu, supra note 4, at 145, 146.
249. The seminal works include MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) and
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). For
surveys of this literature, see W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 375–99
(4th ed. 2005); and Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253, 1262–81 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
250. See 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1120a, at 51 (2d ed. 2003);
Benjamin, supra note 1, at 312–13.
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default position once one acknowledges that there is no reason to privilege a
priori the risks posed by action over the risks posed by inaction.251 As a result,
these commentators have attempted to cabin the problem by reserving such
regulation for circumstances in which the consequences from the failure to act
are potentially catastrophic or irreversible.252 Neither precondition would ap-
pear to be satisfied in the case of network neutrality. As important as innovation
on the Internet is, reduced innovation does not constitute the type of cata-
strophic harm that would justify regulatory intervention in the absence of a
concrete showing of competitive harm. Allowing networks to become noninterop-
erable should not be irreversible. As the experience in reconfiguring local
telephone switches for independent long distance providers demonstrates, courts
and policymakers have been able to retrofit network interfaces to accommodate
neutrality, albeit at substantial immediate cost.253
E. THE AVAILABILITY OF MORE LIMITED RESPONSES TO ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTIVITY
This is not to say that all deviations from network neutrality will invariably
be innocent. Indeed, under my approach such restrictions would not be justified
when the transaction costs of metering bandwidth usage are relatively low. The
adoption of an exclusivity arrangement can also harm existing subscribers by
upsetting their expectations about the complementary services they would be
able to obtain on the open market.254 Another anticompetitive problem that can
arise in a convergent world is when a broadband provider bars access to an
Internet application that competes directly with its core business. One example
is Madison River Communication’s attempt to protect its local telephone busi-
ness by blocking its DSL customers from using VoIP.255 Similar concerns would
be raised if a cable modem provider was to attempt to protect its core cable
television business by prohibiting its cable modem customers from accessing
streaming video. 256
If a sufficient number of competitive options exist, any attempt to use
exclusivity in an anticompetitive manner should be disciplined by the market
over the long run, as end users who dislike the exclusivity arrangement will
simply transfer their subscriptions to a different network. This is why courts and
leading commentators have consistently condemned compelling access to com-
munications networks where alternative network platforms exist.257 As noted
251. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 26–34.
252. See id. at 58–61, 109–17.
253. See Faulhaber, supra note 238, at 81–83.
254. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (holding that
switching and information costs can cause adoption of an exclusivity arrangement with respect to
complementary services to harm existing customers who are locked-in).
255. See supra notes 27, 41, and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 156–58; Saltzer, supra note 4, at 1. But see Wu, supra note 4,
at 164 (finding no evidence that cable operators have barred streaming video).
257. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–89 (1999) (rejecting the imposition of
UNE access when the network elements are available from alternative sources); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v.
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earlier, the broadband industry is already sufficiently competitive to undercut
the justification for depriving last-mile providers of any control over the content
and applications that can be accessed over their networks. The imminent arrival
of new technologies, such as 3G, BPL, WiFi, and WiMax, suggests that the
competition will only intensify in the years to come. And even if intermodal
competition is slow to arrive, the “one monopoly rent theorem” indicates that
last-mile providers will have powerful incentives to maximize the value of their
networks to consumers.258 Although adoption of an exclusivity arrangement
with respect to a complementary service may disadvantage alternative providers
of the complementary service and existing customers who are locked-in, mere
harm to individual competitors or customers does not rise to the level of a
concern under established principles of competition policy unless and until it
has an adverse effect on the competitiveness of the market. The presence of a
sufficient number of competitive alternatives renders such a consequence un-
likely.
In any event, even assuming that these preconditions were met, such consider-
ations would not justify imposing a categorical requirement that all broadband
networks make their networks available to all content and applications. At most,
such considerations would justify a targeted response that either bars DSL
providers from preventing their customers from accessing VoIP, like the consent
decree imposed by the FCC in Madison River, or prohibits cable modem
providers from stopping their customers from accessing streaming video. Under
no circumstances would they provide support for the kind of blanket condemna-
tion of restrictions on the applications end users can run through their broad-
band connections envisioned under network neutrality.
V. ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NETWORK DIVERSITY
The strong justifications for network diversity provided by the economics of
congestion are reinforced by two other economic considerations. First, some
form of discrimination and differentiation is almost certainly inevitable in
industries like telecommunications, which are characterized by large fixed costs.
Second, the emergence of the Internet as an important source of media content
heightens the importance of permitting conduits for that content to exercise
editorial discretion.
FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting decision subjecting DSL-compatible portion of
telephone lines for its failure to take into account competition from cable modem systems); 3A PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 773b2, at 200–03 (2d ed. 2002) (limiting
compelled access to essential facilities to situations in which the facility cannot be obtained from
another source); cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2711
(2005) (upholding the FCC’s decision that the availability of broadband services from other sources
justified refusing to impose access requirements on cable modem systems).
258. See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
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A. THE INEVITABILITY OF DISCRIMINATION AND DIFFERENTIATION
Economic analyses of the telecommunications industry strongly suggest that
price discrimination is essentially inevitable and most likely beneficial. The
reason that discrimination is so pervasive in telecommunications is best under-
stood in terms of the classic model of natural monopoly, which posits that the
presence of large, up-front capital investments259 creates economies of scale
that are not exhausted even when a single firm produces the entire market
output (which means that the demand curve crosses the average cost curve at a
point where the average cost curve is declining and lies above the marginal cost
curve).260 This gives the largest firm a decisive cost advantage that eventually
allows it to drive its competitors out of business. Although the issue is not free
from dispute,261 the high up-front investments needed to establish a telecommu-
nications network have historically been regarded as turning telecommunica-
tions carriers into natural monopolies.262
Any profit-maximizing monopolist will produce at the level where its mar-
ginal revenue curve and its marginal cost curve intersect (represented in Figure
2 by Pmon and Qmon). Because monopolists are not price takers, they set prices
that are inefficiently high, in that they exceed marginal cost. The classic policy
response is to impose some form of rate regulation to lower the price charged
by the monopolist. At the same time, the price must allow the monopolist to
recoup its costs of production, which implies that the prices charged must equal
or exceed average cost. If the monopolist must charge the same price to all
customers, the lowest sustainable price is where the demand curve crosses the
average cost curve (represented in Figure 2 by Psus). The problem is that Psus
still exceeds efficient levels (represented in Figure 2 by Peff and Qeff) in that it
still exceeds marginal cost, with the inefficient shortfall in production repre-
sented by the difference between Qsus and Qeff. The only way that the monopo-
list can satisfy the consumers between Qsus and Qeff is by offering them service
at a price below average cost and by making up the difference by charging other
customers a price that exceeds average cost. In other words, the only way to
259. The theory of contestable markets has added the refinement that large, up-front investments are
not economically problematic unless they are “sunk,” i.e., unrecoverable upon exit. See WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 288–93 (rev. ed. 1988).
260. Although it is a sufficient condition for natural monopoly that the available economies of scale
are unexhausted over the quantity of industry demand, that condition is not a necessary one. Natural
monopoly results whenever a market is subadditive, i.e., whenever a single firm will be able to serve
the entire market at a lower cost than could two producers. If the total industry demand lies just beyond
the lowest point of the average cost curve (which is also called minimum efficient scale), it is possible
for a market to be subadditive even though the monopolist is producing on the increasing portion of the
average cost curve. See id. at 17–19.
261. See Wesley W. Wilson & Yimin Zhou, Telecommunications Deregulation and Subadditive
Costs: Are Local Telephone Monopolies Unnatural?, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 909, 910 (2001) (review-
ing the empirical dispute over whether local telephone service has historically been and currently
remains a natural monopoly).
262. See, e.g., HUBER ET AL., supra note 90, at 2; JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3 (2000).
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maximize economic welfare without driving the monopolist into bankruptcy is
price discrimination.
Indeed, this is the insight underlying Ramsey pricing.263 In infrastructure
industries, the prices charged must allow the network owner to recover a portion
of the up-front, fixed-cost investment in addition to marginal cost. Thus, any
price charged must necessarily exceed marginal cost. The problem is that
pricing above marginal cost is a classic source of inefficiency. Ramsey pricing
relies upon differences in consumers’ elasticities of demand to mitigate this
effect. For those consumers who have relatively elastic demands, increasing
price above marginal cost causes a severe dropoff in consumption. As a result,
these consumers are asked to bear a smaller proportion of the fixed costs.
Conversely, consumers with relatively inelastic demands are more likely to keep
purchasing despite an increase in price. Thus, the best way to recover fixed
costs in an efficient manner is to allocate fixed cost in inverse proportion to the
elasticities of demand and to fund fixed costs by transferring the surplus that
would otherwise be captured by inframarginal consumers to the producer.
Failing to discriminate in this manner results in inefficiency and foregone
welfare gains.
It is for this reason that economic commentators from a wide variety of
263. See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).
Figure 2: Natural Monopoly Pricing, Rate Regulation, and Price
Discrimination
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perspectives support price discrimination as economically beneficial in indus-
tries like telecommunications that require substantial fixed-cost investments,264
and it has long been recognized that usage-sensitive pricing can represent one
form of price discrimination.265 Indeed, there is no reason to expect that
network owners will only attempt to engage in price discriminate vis-à-vis end
users. In a two-sided market, network owners are just as likely to try to price
discriminate with respect to content and applications providers as well. Their
ability to do so will depend largely on the relative bargaining power of each
party.
On a more general level, it is not entirely clear that last-mile providers will
always hold the upper hand in such a bargain. For example, in the cable
television industry, money typically flows in the other direction, with last-mile
providers typically paying cable networks for the right to access their content.
Conversely, with respect to broadcast television, it was the television networks
that historically paid compensation to the local affiliate responsible for distribut-
ing the content to individual homes. In recent years, however, the direction of
the cash flow has sometimes reversed, as the network is able to extract pay-
ments from weaker broadcast affiliates.266 There is thus no reason to assume a
priori that the payments will necessarily flow from the content providers to the
last-mile providers instead of the other way around.
Enshrining the current regime into law, as network neutrality proponents
advocate, would have the unfortunate effect of prohibiting cash from flowing in
either direction. This is because backbones exchange traffic through peering
relationships on a settlement-free basis. In other words, it is impossible for
money to change hands when it crosses a peering point, which in turn forecloses
all business models that depend upon cash payments flowing from last-mile
providers to content providers or vice versa. Institutions that violate network
neutrality, such as content delivery networks like Akamai, make it possible for
money to flow from an entity on one side of a peering point to another.267
264. See, e.g., LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 262, at xv; F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 496–502 (3d ed. 1990); William J. Baumol & Daniel
G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defen-
sible Criteria of Market Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 669–70 (2003); Harold Demsetz, The Private
Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 301–02 (1970); Benjamin Klein & John Shepard
Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property
Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 611–15 (2003); Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination
Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25–26 (2002).
265. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 192, at 23–24, 28; M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line
Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 64–73 (1960); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 293 (1956). For a review of the modern literature on how
bundling products together can effectuate price discrimination, see Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the
Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1706–12 (2003).
266. See, e.g., Broadcaster to Pay NBC in Turnabout: Precedent-Setting Deal Points Up Shift in
Power Between Networks and Their Affiliates, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at C14; Matthew Rose & Joe
Flint, Station Break: Behind the Media-Ownership Fight, An Old Power Struggle Is Raging, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 15, 2003, at A1.
267. See Clark et al., supra note 156, at 20–22.
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Commentators have also recognized that product differentiation can represent
a particularly effective form of price discrimination because product differentia-
tion can identify customers with particularly intense demands for certain prod-
uct features and can price those features to extract a greater proportion of the
requisite surplus.268 Because product differentiation segments the market in a
particular way, it may well prove more efficient than usage-sensitive or tiered
pricing. This suggests that giving last-mile providers the latitude to employ
product differentiation as well as nonlinear pricing regimes may well result in
an increase in economic welfare. As DirecTV’s successful use of an exclusive
programming package known as “NFL Sunday Ticket” illustrates, entering into
exclusivity arrangements with respect to content represents an important means
for differentiating one’s network.269
As I have argued at length elsewhere,270 allowing networks to differentiate
themselves can ameliorate the economic features of telecommunications mar-
kets long thought to lead to market failure. For example, network differentiation
can allow smaller players to survive, despite the presence of unexhausted
economies of scale created by large, up-front sunk costs, by offering products
designed to have greater appeal to smaller subsegments of the overall mar-
ket—in much the same manner that specialty stores survive in a world increas-
ingly dominated by low-cost, mass-market retailers. Network differentiation can
also mitigate the impact of network economic effects. Simply put, a network
valued particularly highly by a subsegment of users can overcome the impact of
network economic effects so long as the increase in utility provided by the
differentiated network exceeds the reduction in utility associated with joining a
smaller network. At the same time, network differentiation can make it possible
for the telecommunications network to serve users who would not otherwise
receive service.
This suggests that broadband policy would be better served if Congress and
the FCC embraced a network diversity principle. More importantly for our
purposes, it also provides yet another economic reason to question the prudence
of imposing network neutrality as a matter of regulation.
268. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16 RAND J. ECON.
380 (1985); Klein & Wiley, supra note 264, at 617 n.34; Levine, supra note 264, at 21; Michael J.
Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 72 (2001).
269. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 32; cf. Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 673, 678 (1999) (noting how exclusivity “can serve to differentiate products and
networks”). Some have argued that the fact that end users are unable to determine whether poor
network performance is caused by the network owner or the content provider is an argument in favor of
network neutrality. See Schatz & Squeo, supra note 33. Ironically, difficulty in distinguishing which of
two companies is responsible for performance inadequacies has traditionally been regarded as a
justification for vertical integration and exclusivity arrangements, not for imposing access requirements.
See Yoo, supra note 178, at 261–63 (citing United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545,
556–57 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam)).
270. See Yoo, supra note 127, at 27–37.
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B. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF EDITORIAL DISCRETION
The Internet has historically been regarded as a “pull” technology in which
end users specified the exact content that they wished to see. The explosion of
content on the World Wide Web has increasingly given the Internet the character-
istics of a “push” technology in which end users rely on intermediaries to
aggregate content into regular e-mail bulletins. Even search engine technologies
have begun to exhibit forms of editorial discretion as they begin to compete on
the quality of their search methodologies.
Mandating content nondiscrimination would represent an ill-advised interfer-
ence with the exercise of editorial discretion that is playing an increasingly
important role on the Internet.271 Editors perform numerous functions, including
guaranteeing quality and ensuring that customers receive an appropriate mix of
material. For example, consider the situation that would result if a publication
such as Sports Illustrated could not exercise editorial control over its pages.
One particular issue of the magazine might consist solely of articles on one
sport without any coverage of other sports, and there would be no way to
guarantee the quality of the writing.
This insight is confirmed by Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s longstand-
ing recognition of the benefits of editorial discretion when the transmission of
content is involved. The seminal statutes with respect to broadcasting reflect the
critical role that editorial discretion plays when content is being transmitted.272
For example, Congress rejected proposals to provide a limited right of nondis-
criminatory access in both the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act
of 1934 and instead enacted a provision specifically prohibiting the regulation
of broadcasters as common carriers.273 In so doing, “Congress specifically dealt
with—and firmly rejected—the argument that the broadcast facilities should be
open on a nonselective basis.”274 The Supreme Court has concurred, repeatedly
reiterating the importance of preserving broadcasters’ editorial discretion.275
Exercise of such discretion inevitably favors some content, but as a plurality of
the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[F]or better or worse, editing is what
271. See id. at 45–48; see also J. MacKie-Mason et al., Service Architecture and Content Provision:
The Network Provider as Editor, 20 TELECOMM. POL’Y 203 (1996) (providing an early analysis of how
application-aware networks can play editorial functions that help manage clutter and attention costs).
272. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702–05 (1979) (reviewing the legislative
history of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 with respect to whether they
should be treated as common carriers); Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 105–11 (1973) (plurality opinion) (same).
273. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 3(h), 48 Stat. 1062, 1066 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 153(10)); Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 17, 44 Stat. 1162, 1169–70 (superseded by the
Communications Act of 1934).
274. Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 105 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 140 n.9 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 151–53 & n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
275. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673–75 (1998); FCC v. League of
Women Voters of Cal., Inc. 468 U.S. 364, 378–80 (1984); Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 105
(plurality opinion); id. at 140 n.9 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 151–53 & n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of material.”276
The same pattern can be discerned with respect to cable television. At first,
the FCC embraced requirements that cable operators make a portion of their
channel capacity available on a nondiscriminatory basis,277 only to see those
regulations struck down by the Supreme Court as inconsistent with the policy of
preserving editorial control over content embodied in the Communications Act
of 1934.278 In the process, the Court emphasized “Congress’ stern disapprov-
al . . . of negation of the editorial discretion otherwise enjoyed by broadcasters
and cable operators alike.”279
The Court’s subsequent decisions reiterated the importance of preserving
cable operators’ editorial discretion.280 Indeed, editorial discretion over content
was so important that courts invalidated restrictions prohibiting local telephone
companies from establishing cable television networks, finding these restric-
tions constituted an impermissible burden on the telephone companies’ First
Amendment rights.281 Congress later enacted a provision limiting cable opera-
tors’ editorial control over portions of their channel capacity, requiring cable
operators to set aside a portion of their channel capacity for leased access to
unaffiliated programmers.282 A majority of the Court recognized that leased
access represents an intrusion into the cable operators’ editorial discretion.283
On a more practical level, regulations designed to guarantee access to content
have proven quite difficult to implement.284 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
276. Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 124 (plurality opinion).
277. See Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the Cable
Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251, Report and Order,
59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976); Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and Regula-
tions Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice
of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 427 ¶ 26 (1968).
278. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699–707 (1979).
279. Id. at 708.
280. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994); City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986); cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444
(1984) (“Cable television provides to its subscribers news, information, and entertainment.”).
281. See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 516
U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn.
1995); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v.
United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. 93-323-P-C,
1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994). The issue had already been briefed and argued before the
Supreme Court when it was rendered moot by a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
eliminating the rule. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat.
56, 124 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994)).
282. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, sec. 2, § 611, 98 Stat. 2779,
2782 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 532).
283. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 761 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (noting that § 10(a) restored part of cable operators’ editorial discretion over leased access
channels); id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting
in part) (noting that leased access represents a derogation of the cable operators’ editorial control).
284. See Yoo, supra note 178, at 244–45.
1906 [Vol. 94:1847THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
that practical problems have rendered leased access largely ineffective.285
The same principles apply to the Internet as it moves away from person-to-
person communications to media content. This shift argues in favor of allowing
telecommunications networks to exercise editorial control. Indeed, anyone con-
fronting the avalanche of content available on the Internet can attest to the
benefits provided by editorial filters. This transition also weakens the case for
network neutrality.
CONCLUSION
On its face, the vision of an Internet in which every user can access any
content, run any application, and attach any device on a nondiscriminatory basis
has considerable intuitive appeal. Such unfettered choice would appear to be a
natural part of promoting consumer welfare. Indeed, the fact that end users have
long been free from any end user restrictions makes network neutrality appear
to be a natural baseline and would seem to justify placing the burden of proof
on those who wish to deviate from it.
There is considerable danger in reflexively regarding deviations from the
status quo with suspicion.286 Upon closer inspection, nonstandard practices are
all too often revealed to have procompetitive benefits. Such is the case with the
network neutrality debate. An examination of the economics of congestion
provides policy justifications for precisely the type of restrictions that network
neutrality would condemn. Each of the restrictions challenged by network
neutrality proponents is associated with bandwidth-intensive uses and thus may
represent a plausible Coasean proxy for heavy consumption of network re-
sources. As a result, if transaction costs render direct metering prohibitively
expensive, network owners may well find it beneficial to impose restrictions on
bandwidth-intensive network uses. Access tiering and caching by content deliv-
ery networks represent other alternative solutions to the problems of congestion
and latency. Although exclusivity arrangements place some limits on customer
and producer freedom, those limits should not pose a threat to economic welfare
285. See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30–32 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1163–65; H.R.
REP. NO. 102-628, at 39–40 (1992); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 968–69 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992: Rate Regulation, Order on Reconsideration of First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 16933, 16937 ¶ 6 (1996); Donna M. Lampert, Cable Television:
Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 245, 266–67 & n.122 (1992).
286. As Ronald Coase noted:
One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly problem is that if an economist
finds something—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not understand, he
looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of
understandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation
frequent.
R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (V.R. Fuchs ed., 1972).
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so long as competition is sufficiently robust, because any frustrated customer
would remain free to switch providers. In this sense, the resolution that I
propose parallels the development of vertical integration theory by showing
how transaction costs can render vertical integration economically preferable to
the type of atomistic competition that would arise under network neutrality.
Exclusivity arrangements may in fact promote consumer welfare in ways that
are often overlooked. By placing limits on bandwidth-intensive activities, end
user restrictions can have the effect of reducing or eliminating the de facto cross
subsidy that low-intensity users pay high-intensity users. These limits can also
expand consumption by lowering the price of basic access to the network. As a
result, low-intensity users may well see the prices they pay for broadband
services decrease.
Given the ambiguity about whether mandating network neutrality would
promote or impede economic welfare, the more technologically humble course
would be for policymakers to embrace a principle of network diversity, which
would permit individual network owners to explore alternative business arrange-
ments until concrete harm to competition can be demonstrated. Although prophy-
lactic regulation might be justified under extreme circumstances, deviations
from network neutrality would not seem to pose the kind of irreversible and
catastrophic risks that would justify foreclosing this type of experimentation.
Whatever risks that broadband providers will use, their control over the last-
mile to protect their legacy business models is more properly addressed by
targeted prohibitions of the type imposed by the FCC in Madison River rather
than by a categorical nondiscrimination requirement.
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